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Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.'
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ABSTRACT
No one ever argues for copyright on the grounds that superstar artists and authors
need more money, but what if that is all, or mostly all, that copyright does? This article
presents newly available data on the distribution of players across the PC videogame mar-
ket. This data reveals an L-shaped distribution of demand. A relative handful of games are
extremely popular. The vast majority are not. In the face of an L curve, copyright overpays
superstars, but does very little for the average author and for works at the margins of prof-
itability. This makes copyright difficult to justify on either efficiency or fairness grounds.
To remedy this, I propose two approaches. First, we should incorporate cost recoupment
into the fourth fair use factor. Once a work has recouped its costs, any further use, whether
for follow-on creativity or mere duplication, would be fair and non-infringing. Through
such an interpretation of fair use, copyright would ensure every socially valuable work a
reasonable opportunity to recoup its costs without lavishing socially costly excess incentives
on the most popular. Second and alternatively, Congress could make copyright short, nar-
row, and relatively ineffective at preventing unauthorized copying. If we refuse to use fair
use or other doctrines to tailor copyright's protection on a work-by-work basis and instead
insist that copyright provide generally uniform protection, then efficiency and fairness both
require that the uniform protection be far shorter, narrower, and generally less effective
than it presently is.
' Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. I would like to thank Chris
Buccafusco, Mala Chatterjee, Abraham Drassinower,Joseph Fishman,Jeanne Fromer, Kristelia
Garcia,Jim Gibson, Wendy Gordon,Justin Hughes, Mark Lemley, Rob Merges, Jennifer Roth-
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I. INTRODUCTION
No one ever argues for longer, broader, or more effective copyright on the
grounds that superstar authors and artists need more money.' If only copyright's
term were extended for another twenty years, Taylor Swift could own ten homes,
instead of only eight.2 If only copyright were more effective at limiting the use of
1. Taylor Swift came close in an ill-conceived Wall Street Journal editorial in July 2014:
Music is art, and art is important and rare. Important, rare things are valuable. Valu-
able things should be paid for. It's my opinion that music should not be free ....
Taylor Swift, For Taylor Swift, the Future of Music is a Love Story, WALL ST. J. (Jul. 7, 2014),
https://perma.cc/6CRU-9Q4X. When Apple announced a free three-month trial for consum-
ers for its streaming service the following year-streams for which artists would not be paid-
Ms. Swift changed her tune and emphasized the plight of the average artist:
This is not about me. Thankfully I am on my fifth album and can support myself, my
band, crew, and entire management team by playing live shows. This is about the new
artist or band that has just released their first single and will not be paid for its suc-
cess. This is about the young songwriter who just got his or her first cut and thought
that the royalties from that would get them out of debt. This is about the producer
who works tirelessly to innovate and create ....
Kaitlyn Tiffany, A History of Taylor Swift's Odd, Conflicting Stances on Streaming Services, THE
VERGE (Jun. 9, 2017), https://perma.cc/62KB-K5PM.
2. See, e.g., Hillary Hoffower & Shayanne Gal, Taylor Swift Just Turned 30 and Already Owns
At Least $81 Million in Real Estate in the U.S.: Here's a Look at Her Mansions and Penthouses, Bus.
INSIDER (Dec. 13, 2019), https://perma.cc/T74Y-JXBC.
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file sharing, Ms. Swift could earn $200 million a year, instead of only 3170 mil-
lion. If only copyright could close the imaginary "value gap" and force YouTube
to pay a higher per-stream royalty rate, Ms. Swift could have a net worth of $400
million, instead of only $320 million.4
No one argues for longer, broader, or more effective copyright on these
grounds for a simple reason: These arguments are unpersuasive. It is not just that
superstar artists, such as Ms. Swift, are already members of the 1%. It is that
strengthening copyright to further enrich Ms. Swift would advance none of cop-
yright's legitimate purposes. From an efficiency or social welfare perspective, su-
perstar artists, such as Ms. Swift, already earn more from a single hit than the
average college-educated American will earn in a lifetime. Paying them 10%
more on any given hit is unlikely to increase their creative output. To the con-
trary, as I have shown in a landmark study of the music industry, paying our su-
perstar artists more, as we did in the 1990s, reduced their creative output.6 From
a just deserts perspective, copyright is already awarding superstar artists a dispro-
portionate share of society's wealth for their labor. I enjoy Ms. Swift's music, but
even as a fan, I have to admit that the marginal private value copyright enables
Ms. Swift to capture is likely already greater than the marginal social value she
creates.7 From a distributive justice perspective, broadening copyright to ensure
that superstars such as Ms. Swift earned more for their music would shift wealth
from the poor to the rich. That is not distributive justice, but its opposite.
3. See Zack O'Malley Greenburg, Celeb 100: The World's Highest-Paid Celebrities of 2016,
FORBES (Jul. 11, 2016), https://perma.cc/J3FT-ZF9E (estimating Taylor Swift's earnings for
2016 at $170 million).
4. See Zack O'Malley Greenburg, Taylor Swift's Net Worth: $320 Million in 2018, FORBES
(Jul. 11, 2018), https://perma.cc/BPS8-78BD.
5. See GLYNN S. LUNNEY JR., COPYRIGHT's EXCESS: MONEY AND MUSIC IN THE U.S.
RECORDING INDUSTRY 180-81 (2018) (noting that testimony in the Blurred Lines trial showed
that the songwriters and artists involved earned more than $28 million in profits on the song,
for a song that required less than a day to record, and comparing that to median lifetime earn-
ings for a college-educated worker of $2.7 million).
6. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5, at 157-92. Today, there are over forty
million songs and podcasts available. Celebrating a Decade of Discovery on Spotify, SPOTIFY
(Oct. 10, 2018), https://perma.cc/MR4F-87ZD.
7. This is the implication of Marshall's superstar model. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT'S
EXCESS, supra note 5, at 34-37 (discussing Marshall's superstar model and applying it to music);
see also ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICs 728 (1890) (introducing the super-
star model, but suggesting, given the technology of the day, that it did not apply to singers);
Sherwin Rosen, The Economics of Superstars, 71 AM. EcON. REv. 845 (1981); Alan Krueger, The
Economics of Real Superstars: The Market for Rock Concerts in the Material World, 23J. LABOR EcON.
1 (2005). See also infra text accompanying notes 84-87.
8. Although often achieved through market ransactions, I do not see this transfer from
copyright consumers to copyright owners as truly voluntary. First, many copyrighted works
are essential, including textbooks, reference books, and many forms of software. Hard to im-
agine living today without a computer and a word-processing program. Second, I see a key
difference between the use or threat of government force to maintain high market prices for
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To justify itself, copyright needs to help a group of middle-class artists, or
better yet starving artists, not just the superstars. For this reason, proponents of
longer, broader, and more effective copyright focus their story-telling efforts on
the marginal and proverbially starving artist and the more ordinary folks whose
work copyright supports.' The problem is that these stories are deceptively mis-
leading. Consider Spotify as an example and the ongoing debate over whether
streaming royalties are high enough. In 2018, there were forty million songs in
Spotify's catalog.10 The most popular song on Spotify, to date, has been Ed
Sheeran's Shape of You." It has been streamed more than two billion times.1 2 It is
easy to see how longer, broader, or more effective copyright protection that in-
creased the per-stream royalty rate would increase the earnings associated with
that song. However, at least as of 2013, there were four million songs on Spotify
that had never been streamed, not even once." For the copyright owners of those
rivalrous, private goods, such as apples, and the use or threat of force to maintain high prices
for nonrival goods, such as copies of novels or movies. The first does not reduce the supply of
apples available in the market and thus does not increase market prices; the second does. Third,
in the end, I agree with the Copyright Royalty Board on this issue: "[N] either sellers nor buyers
can be said to be 'willing' partners to an agreement if they are coerced to agree to a price through
the exercise of overwhelming market power." Determinations of Royalty Rates and Terms for
Ephemeral Recording and Webcasting Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Web IV), 81
Fed. Reg. 26,316, 26,331 (May 2, 2016), quoted in SoundExchange, Inc. v. Copyright Royalty Bd.,
904 F.3d 41, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
9. For example, Michael O'Leary, of the Motion Picture Association of America, testi-
fied in favor of the Stop Online Piracy Act by pointing to the ordinary workers whose jobs
copyright supports:
Fundamentally, this is about jobs. The motion picture and television industry
supports more than two million American jobs in all 50 states. The 20 states and
Puerto Rico represented by this Committee are home to 1.7 million American jobs
supported by the motion picture and television industry, including more than
525,000 direct motion picture and television industry jobs. About 12 percent of those
are directly employed in motion picture and television production and distribution,
jobs paying an average annual salary of nearly $79,000. Those are not just the people
whose names you see on the marquee in front of the theater they're the hardworking
people behind the scenes, from the carpenter who built the set, to the costumer and
make-up artist who helped bring each character to life, to the Foley artist who created
the sound effects.
The "Stop Online Piracy Act": Hearing on H.R. 3261 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong.
72 (2011) (statement of Michael P. O'Leary, Senior Exec. Vice President, Global Policy and Ex-
ternal Affairs, on behalf of the Motion Picture Association of America, Inc.).
10. Mansoor Iqbal, Spotify Usage and Revenue Statistics (2019), BUSINESSOFAPPs (May 10,
2019), https://perma.cc/YGT4-C5XG.
11. Celebrating a Decade of Discovery on Spotify, SPOTIFY (Oct. 10, 2018),
https://perma.cc/Z9QR-HKPL.
12. As of January 15, 2019, Spotify lists the song as being streamed 2.039 billion times.
For instructions on how to see the stream count for any song on Spotify, see On Spotify, Can
You Check the Total View Count for a Song? QuoRA (Aug. 15, 2017), https://perma.cc/5X8U-
VKFP.
13. See Mario Aguilar, More Than 4 Million Spotify Songs Have Never Been Played, GIZMODO
(Oct. 14, 2013), https://perma.cc/SH3F-XZN7.
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four million songs, a longer, broader, or more effective copyright does nothing.
Even if we could change copyright and thereby increase the per-stream royalty
rate by 10%, 10% more of nothing is still nothing. Nothing copyright can do will
increase the earnings associated with a song to which no one wants to listen.
Of course, between the most popular song on Spotify and the least popular
songs on Spotify, there is a whole range of more-or-less popular songs. Even if it
is true that copyright can do nothing for the songs to which no one wants to listen,
surely it can help some of those whose works lie in the middle-works that are
neither the work of superstars nor completely uninteresting. Critically, however,
that depends on the demand for works in the middle. On Spotify, for example,
does the "average" song receive 50,000 streams a year or only 500? If only 500,
then arguing that copyright should ensure an increased royalty rate on streaming
in order to provide a livable wage for the average artist is both a fool's game and
misleading. It is a fool's game because even doubling Spotify's current maximum
rate of $0.0084 per stream would increase the royalties for such a song by only
$4.20 annually.1 4 It is misleading because it asks us to focus on that $4.20 and
ignore the tens of millions of dollars such a doubling would take from consumers
and transfer to already vastly overpaid superstars."
Because a desire to overpay superstars cannot justify copyright, any compel-
ling justification requires an understanding of how the demand for various works
of authorship is distributed between the most and least popular works. Unfortu-
nately, on this key issue, there has been no solid evidence. This is not to say that
the data does not exist. In the music space, for example, collectives, such as
ASCAP, BMI, SESAC, and SoundExchange, as well as streaming services, such as
Spotify, Apple Music, and YouTube, all know exactly how the demand, and con-
sequently the rents or incentives copyright generates, are distributed among the
various musical works or sound recordings in their respective catalogs or on their
platforms. Similarly, in other copyright industries, publishers and distributors
know the distribution of demand for books, computer programs, and audiovisual
works. Although industry players have this data, they have not historically shared
it with the rest of us. They have not shared it even when they come to Congress
insisting that they need ever-longer, ever-broader, and ever-more-effective cop-
yright. At best, they may release sales data for a select group of best-sellers in their
industries and leave us to guess how less popular works fare in the marketplace.
As a practical matter, this has left us with effectively two data points: (i) at the
high end of the demand distribution curve, we may know the sales for a relative
handful of the most popular works; and (ii) at the low end, we may know or can
14. See Spotify Explains Royalty Structure, Offers New Services, THE TENNESSEAN (Dec. 14,
2013), https://perma.cc/M2C6-8E2P. If the "average" work receives 50,000 streams a year,
doubling the per-stream royalty rate would increase the associated royalties of the average
work from Spotify by $420 annually. That is not a livable wage on its own, but most artists have
more than one song on Spotify, and Spotify is not the only streaming service or revenue source.
15. Doubling the rate would have paid an additional $16.8 million to the copyright own-
ers of Shape of You alone.
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reasonably assume that the last few works do not sell at all well. Lacking any hard
data on how demand is distributed between these two endpoints, the almost in-
evitable practice has been to draw a more-or-less straight line connecting the two.
Whether we draw that straight line explicitly or simply assume it implicitly some-
where in the back of our heads, that straight-line distribution allows us to pretend
that there is a significant middle class of authors that copyright benefits.
That more-or-less straight-line assumption, though rarely discussed, let
alone critically examined, turns out to be crucial for any compelling justification
for copyright. As the distribution of demand among works of authorship becomes
more sharply skewed, copyright becomes more difficult to justify. As the distri-
bution becomes more sharply skewed, more and more of the demand in the mar-
ket is concentrated in fewer and fewer works. At the extreme, the distribution of
demand comes to resemble an L. Graphically, if we plot the demand for a work
on the y-axis against its popularity rank within the industry on the x-axis, we find
two lines. First, there is a vertical line on and immediately adjacent to the y-axis.
This is copyright's tall peak and represents the very high demand for a relative
handful of extremely popular works. Second, there is a second, shorter horizontal
line lying flat against the x-axis. This is copyright's short tail16 and represents the
very low demand for all of the rest. If we connect those two lines, the resulting
distribution of demand resembles an L-tall peak, short tail.
Copyright owners want to focus our attention on how copyright helps those
in its short tail, but it is copyright's tall peak which should command our atten-
tion. As the distribution of demand comes more closely to resemble an L, copy-
right's direct benefits flow increasingly to the superstar artists and authors in the
tall peak. With a true L curve distribution, all of copyright's incentives flow to
those superstars. None flows to the marginal or average author in copyright's
short tail. In the face of an L curve, unless we can justify copyright on the basis of
overpaying superstars, copyright becomes all cost and no benefit, almost regard-
less of how we define cost and benefit.
For the first time, in this article, I present empirical data from one copyright
sector, the PC videogame industry, demonstrating that the distribution of de-
mand for works of authorship in that industry resembles an L-curve. A relative
16. By manipulating the scale, we can make the tail appear long, as others have done. See
CHRIS ANDERSON, THE LONG TAIL: WHY THE FUTURE OF BUSINESS IS SELLING LESS OF MORE
(2006). I refer to the tail as "short" for two reasons. First, descriptively, it is short, at least relative
to the peak. While 40 million songs is a large number, it is less than 2% of the stream count for
the most popular song. Second, as a rhetorical matter, I want to de-emphasize the tail and focus
our attention on the most popular works. In the PC videogame data presented in this article,
the most popular 10% capture 90% of the rents copyright generates. See infra text accompanying
notes 150-152. Where we have data, the data suggests that that share has increased in the digital
age for works of authorship generally. See infra note 150. Over the long term, works in the tall
peak become part of the cultural patrimony; works in the tail rarely do. For example, can you
name the second-best playwright in London in Shakespeare's day or the second-best composer
in Vienna in Mozart's? Can you name any of their works? For these reasons, focusing on works
in the tail is a mistake.
Vol. 23:16
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handful of games are popular, and those that are popular are very popular indeed.
All of the remaining games-the vast majority-are not popular at all. I then ex-
plore more thoroughly the implications of that empirical data for copyright. To
set the stage for the data, Part II of the article will begin with a brief review of the
theoretical justifications for copyright and explore how the distribution of de-
mand matters to each of them. Part III introduces the data. Part IV examines its
normative significance and doctrinal implications. Part V concludes.
The key point, however, is simple: If all or most of what copyright does is
enrich the one percent, then it cannot be justified. Such a copyright regime is nei-
ther fair, efficient, nor just. In the face of an L-shaped distribution of demand, the
question becomes whether we can redesign copyright law to support the average
artist and encourage the marginal work, without unduly enriching superstars.
II. SETTING THE STAGE
In the United States, the Constitution authorizes Congress to enact copyright
for a single purpose: "the Progress of Science."1 The Court, in turn, has defined
"the Progress of Science" to include two legitimate ends: (i) encouraging the cre-
ation of new, original works; and (ii) ensuring that those works are widely avail-
able to the public." The Constitution's language would seem to require a social
welfare or efficiency-driven copyright-a copyright that seeks to encourage the
creation of new, original works and to ensure that they are widely available to the
public.19 But other normative justifications also seem to play a role in the Ameri-
can copyright system. These include: (i) a vague notion of just or labor desert; and
(ii) a desire for distributive or social justice. In the next Subpart, I will introduce
each of these justifications briefly. In the following Subpart, I will then consider
the importance of the distribution of demand to each of them and explore, in pre-
liminary fashion, whether we can justify copyright under an L-shaped distribu-
tion of demand.
A. Justifications for Copyright
The welfare or efficiency argument for copyright is not new. The Stationers'
Guild asserted the basic argument more than four hundred years ago in a 1586
petition to the Star Chamber:
And further if privileges [that is, copyright] be revoked no books at all
should be printed, within a short time, for commonly the first printer is
at charge for the Author's pains, and some other such like extraordinary
cost, where an other that will print it after him, comes to the Copy gratis,
17. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
18. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,206 (2003).
19. Id.
Winter 2020 7
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and so may he sell better cheaper than the first printer, and then the first
printer shall never utter [that is, sell] his books.2 0
Today, the basic efficiency argument for copyright remains the same.2 1 In this
argument, without copyright, a copying competitor would copy each popular
work as it came out and sell it for less. Desperate for a bargain, consumers would
purchase the cheaper copies, and the original author would earn nothing or very
little for her labor. Foreseeing that outcome, many authors would forego author-
ship altogether and invest their time and talents elsewhere. They would invest
their talents elsewhere even when society would value their work as authors more
highly.
At the outset, we should realize that this is just a story-a story that lawyers
came up with in an attempt to win a case for their clients. It is a story that has
been long told and often repeated, at least in copyright circles. Yet, that does not
make it true. While we can devise a mathematical model that supports the argu-
ment,2 2 that model requires certain assumptions, and those assumptions are ver-
ifiably and materially false.23 If we change those assumptions, we can devise dif-
ferent models that reach different conclusions. In other work, I and others have
presented such alternative models demonstrating that: (i) the market will over-
produce original works of authorship in the absence of copyright (Marshall's "su-
perstar" model)24 ; (ii) the market can reach the optimal output of original works
of authorship in the absence of copyright (the "discrete goods" model)25 ; and (iii)
20. STATIONERS' COMPANY, A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF
STATIONERS OF LONDON: 1554-1640 A.D. 805 (Edward Arber ed. 1875).
21. See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18
J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326-27 (1989); Glynn S. Lunney,Jr., Reexamining Copyright's Incentives-Access
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REv. 483 (1996) (hereinafter Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm); see also
H.R. Rep. No. 60-2222, at 7 (1909) ("In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider...
two questions: First, how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the
public; and, second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public?").
22. The original mathematical model that supports this view is Paul Samuelson's. See Paul
A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditures, 36 REv. EcON. STATS. 387 (1954).
23. I am aware that all economic models simplify, and in that sense, are false. See, e.g.,
GEORGE E.P. Box & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND RESPONSE SURFACES
74 (1987) ("[A]ll models are wrong; the practical question is how wrong do they have to be to
not be useful."). That is not the point that I am making. I am suggesting that the traditional
account used to justify copyright is sufficiently wrong not to be useful.
24. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT'S EXCESS, supra note 5, at 34-37; see also supra note 7.
25. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT'S EXCESS, supra note 5, at 32-34; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copy-
right, Private Copying, and Discrete Public Goods, 12 TULANEJ. TECH. & INT. PROP. 1 (2009); see also
Charles Brain Cadsby & Elizabeth Maynes, Voluntary Provision of Threshold Public Goods with
Continuous Contributions: Experimental Evidence, 71 J. PUB. EcON. 53, 68-69 (1999) ("[O]ur exper-
iments provide many examples where groups move toward cooperation rather than free-riding
over time. Indeed, our results indicate that a deterioration in the level of contributions is a spe-
cial case, occurring only when the incentives to reach an efficient equilibrium are relatively
Vol. 23:18
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the market may over-produce, under-produce, or produce the optimal output of
original works in the absence of copyright, there's no way to know which, and
there's also no way to know whether establishing copyright will make the situa-
tion better or worse (the theory of the second best).26
The only way to know which of these models captures the truth, or at least
an aspect of the truth, is to test them empirically-a task that is just beginning.27
While that task continues, these models remain useful because they help identify
the relevant empirical questions we will need to answer. For example, if we accept
the Stationers' Guild's argument, the associated economic model identifies both
the relevant costs and the relevant benefits of enacting or expanding copyright.
The benefit of copyright, in this model, is the additional works copyright encour-
ages at the margins of profitability. When we initially enact copyright or subse-
quently expand its protection, whether by extending copyright's term, broaden-
ing copyright's scope, or making copyright more effective at preventing
unauthorized copying, we increase the economic return for creating any given
work of authorship. By doing so, we provide more incentives for, and thereby
ensure the existence of, additional works at the margins. Again, in this model, the
fear is that with no copyright or narrower copyright, some marginal authors will
not be able to earn enough to cover their persuasion costs. If they do not expect
to cover their costs, they will forego authorship and use their skills elsewhere in
the economy, even when society would more highly value the use of their time
for authorship. As we initially adopt or subsequently expand copyright, marginal
authors will earn more for their work, and for some of them, their earnings will
become large enough to cover their persuasion costs of authoring and distributing
their work. With copyright, rather than without, or with broader, rather than nar-
rower, copyright, some additional authors will expect to earn a profit, where they
would otherwise expect a loss. As a result, with copyright, rather than without, or
with broader, rather than narrower, copyright, society will receive additional
works of authorship. In this framework, the net social value of these marginal
low. The more general result is that contributions move toward a Nash equilibrium over re-
peated rounds of a public goods game."); Daniel Rondeau et al., Voluntary Revelation of the De-
mand for Public Goods Using a Provision Point Mechanism, 72J. PUB. EcON. 455, 468 (1999) ("Using
large groups in an induced value framework, we have shown that the provision point mecha-
nism with money-back guarantee and proportional rebate of excess contributions can closely
approximate demand revelation."). For some of the literature exploring why individuals do not
always free ride when they can, see DOUGLAs D. DAVIS & CHARLEs A. HOLT, EXPERIMENTAL
EcoNoMics 317-43 (1993); Thomas R. Palfrey &Jeffrey E. Prisbrey, Anomalous Behavior in Public
Goods Experiments: How Much and Why?, 87 AM. EcoN. REv. 829 (1997).
26. See Lunney, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5, at 37-38; see also R.G. Lipsey & Kelvin
Lancaster, The General Theory of Second Best, 24 REv. ECON. STUD. 11 (1956) (formally showing
that in the presence of imperfections, such as market power or externalities in other markets,
the normative conclusions of partial equilibrium analysis are unreliable).
27. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5.
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works over and above the social value that would have been created had the au-
thor devoted her talents elsewhere in the economy28 represents copyright's ben-
efit.
Copyright's cost, in this framework, arises because copyright is uniform.29
For any given length, breadth, or effectiveness of copyright protection, and even
for no copyright at all, some works will be authored and distributed. Copyright
did not exist in the Anglo-American legal world until the Statute of Anne in
1710.30 Yet, books, such as The Iliad, Beowulf and Don Quixote, were written and
distributed before that time-written and distributed without any copyright at
all. As copyright protection was repeatedly extended and expanded from the first
American copyright act in 1790 until today, books, such as Pride and Prejudice, A
Tale of Two Cities, and Frankenstein, were written and distributed under one of the
historical copyright regimes that provided much shorter and narrower protection
than we have today.1 Had we never enacted copyright, or had we retained the
much shorter and narrower versions of the 18th, 19th, or early 20th century, pre-
sumably some authors would have continued to write and distribute their works,
just as they had before copyright was enacted and expanded.3 2 Even if we focus
28. In a partial equilibrium model, we assume that this opportunity cost is fully internal-
ized in the author's reservation price for authoring and distributing her work. There is no rea-
son to believe that this assumption will generally be true in the real world. In the economy
generally, positive and negative externalities abound, and imperfectly supplied public goods are
commonplace. A more realistic model would recognize the possibility that an individual can
earn more as an author or artist and thus cover her reservation cost, yet her contribution to
society would be more valuable elsewhere in the economy, perhaps as a teacher or engineer.
29 See Glynn S. Lunney,Jr., Patents, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court: A Quiet Rev-
olution, 11 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 1, 40-56 (2004) (identifying and modeling the uniformity costs
associated with intellectual property in the context of patent law) [hereinafter A Quiet Revolu-
tion]; Michael W. Carroll, One ForAll and Allfor One: The Problem of Uniformity Costs in Intellectual
Property Law, 15 Am. U.L. REv. 845 (2006) (extending the uniformity costs analysis to copyright).
30. 8Ann.,c. 19(1710)(Eng.).
31. Jane Eyre and Charles Dickens, the authors of Pride and Prejudice and A Tale of Two
Cities, respectively, were both British. At the time they were published, American copyright law
did not protect the works of foreign authors. As a result, their works were not protected by
copyright in the United States at all. The United States extended copyright o foreign authors
for the first time in the Copyright Act of 1909. Compare Act of Mar. 4, 1909 § 9, 35 Stat. 1075,
1077 (recognizing rights of foreign authors in certain cases), with Act of Jul. 8, 1870 § 86, 16
Stat. 198, 212 (limiting copyrights to United States citizens).
32. The most recent example of this is the outpouring of sound recordings in the United
States by superstar recording artists, ranging from Elvis Presley to Jimi Hendrix, in the 1950s
into the early 1970s. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5, at 89 (showing that 1968-
1972 were the best years in terms of top albums released according to Rolling Stone's ranking of
the top albums of all time). Congress did not formally protect sound recordings under federal
copyright law until 1971 for recordings fixed after February 15, 1972. Sound Recording
Amendment, Pub. L. No. 92-140, § 3, 85 Stat. 391, 392 (1971). A similar outpouring occurred
again following the rise of file sharing. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5, at 89
(using Soundscan data to show a sharp rise in the number of albums released annually after
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on profit-motivated, rather than intrinsically-motivated, authorship, lead-time
advantages," reputational rents,3 4 the willingness of consumers to pay more for
access to an authorized or official copy," the ability to collect revenue through
complementary products,3 6 and other market mechanisms would ensure that sub-
stantial authorial output would occur even in the absence of copyright." If any
doubt remains on this issue, we can look to high creative output in sectors such
as fashion, food, and open-source software, with seemingly similar free rider
problems, but without copyright, to put those doubts to rest." I will call the works
that would have been, or would be, authored and distributed with less or no cop-
yright "non-marginal" works.
When we initially adopt or later expand copyright, copyright extends its new
or broader protection to both the marginal and the non-marginal work alike. This
uniformity imposes a cost. Just as copyright, or broader copyright, provides in-
centives by increasing the revenue a copyright owner captures on the marginal
2000). While the rise of file sharing did not kill the sound recording copyright entirely, it defi-
nitely reduced the effective level of copyright protection for such works. Id. at 74-80. While the
traditional account suggests that reducing copyright protection would decrease creative out-
put, that is not what happened in the recording industry. Less copyright was associated with
more and better music, or at the very least, with no loss in music output. Id. at 3-4; see also
Christian Handke, Digital Copying and the Supply of Sound Recordings, 24 INFO. EcON. & POL'Y 15
(2012) (examining the release of new albums in Germany from 1984 through 2006 and finding
that neither the quantity nor quality of original sound recordings fell after the rise of file shar-
ing); Joel Waldfogel, Copyright Protection, Technological Change, and the Quality of New Products:
Evidence from Recorded Music Since Napster, 55J.L. & EcON. 715 (2012) (examining the number
of albums released and critics' evaluations of albums released in the United States from 1980
through 2010 and finding that neither the quantity nor quality of the releases changed after the
rise of file sharing).
33. See Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright-A Study of Copyright in Books, Pho-
tocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REv. 281, 286 (1970).
34. See Lunney, A Quiet Revolution, supra note 29, at 59-63 (presenting a model showing
how reputational rents can incentivize innovation).
35. See Glynn S. Lunney,Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying, and
the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 87 VA. L. REv. 813(2001) (discussing voluntary contribution
models as a mechanism for funding the production of public goods, including original works
of authorship) [hereinafter The Death of Copyright].
36. See Glynn S. Lunney,Jr., Copyright, Derivative Works, and the Economics of Complements,
12 VAND.J. ENT. & TECH. L. 779 (2010); Jiariu Liu, Copyright Complements and Piracy-Induced
Deadweight Losses, 90 IND. L.J. 1011 (2015).
37. See Breyer, supra note 33, at 301-07 ("In sum, without copyright protection organizing
buyers to channel needed funds to publishers may sometimes prove difficult but will often
prove practical. The ability to organize buyers-along with the initial publisher's 'retaliatory'
and 'lead time' advantages-should severely limit-even though it may not eliminate-the rev-
enue loss which publishers fear that unrestricted competition threatens."); Lunney, A Quiet Rev-
olution, supra note 29, at 56-64.
38. SeeJessica Litman, The Exclusive Right to Read, 13 CARDOZO ARTs & ENT. L.J. 29, 44-46
(1994); Kal Raustiala & Christopher Sprigman, The Piracy Paradox: Innovation and Intellectual
Properly in Fashion Design, 92 VA. L. REv. 1687, 1689 (2006); Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or,
Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369 (2002); Josh Lerner &Jean Tirole, Some Simple
Economics of Open Source, 50J. INDUs. EcoN. 197 (2002).
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work, it also increases the revenue copyright owners capture on non-marginal
works. For the marginal work, this additional revenue is necessary to ensure the
marginal work's expected profitability and hence existence. But he additional
revenue is not necessary to ensure a non-marginal work's creation and distribu-
tion. By our definition of non-marginal, the non-marginal work would exist even
with no or with narrower copyright. The additional revenue that copyright or
broader copyright provides to these non-marginal works exceeds the author's
persuasion cost for creating and distributing his or her work. Such revenue is un-
necessary to ensure these works' creation and distribution. In that sense, copy-
right offers "excess" incentives.
On their own, these excess incentives are a mere wealth transfer, from con-
sumers of a given work to its copyright owner, and thus not a direct welfare loss.
Nevertheless, their availability will impose, inter alia, three types of welfare losses.
First, as has been well recognized, to transfer these excess incentives from con-
sumers to copyright owner through the market requires a higher price for access
to the non-marginal work-a price higher than necessary to ensure the work's
creation and distribution.39 These higher-than-necessary prices in turn will force
some consumers who are unable to afford the excessively high price to do without
and force some follow-on creators to forego their projects.4 0 Like any other
wealth transfer through the market, the availability of excess incentives will thus
impose the familiar specter of deadweight welfare losses. Some consumers will
unnecessarily be denied access. Some follow-on creativity will not occur. For this
reason, courts and commentators often suggest hat balancing incentives and ac-
cess represents the key criteria for optimal copyright.4 1 In this framing, "incen-
tives" serves as the proxy for the marginal social value of the additional works
39. Kenneth Arrow is generally credited with the modern formulation of the paradigm:
"In a free enterprise economy, inventive activity is supported by using the invention to create
property rights; precisely to the extent that it is successful, there is an underutilization of the
information." KennethJ. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in
THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 609, 617 (1962).
40. See William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1659,
1702 (1988); Lunney, Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, supra note 21, at 497-98.
41. See Feist Publ's. Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) ("The primary
objective of copyright is not to reward the labors of authors, but '[tlo promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts.' To this end, copyright assures authors the right to their original ex-
pression, but encourages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a
work." (citations omitted)); Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,429 (1984)
("This limited grant [that is, copyright] is a means by which an important public purpose may
be achieved. It is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the
provision of a special reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after
the limited period of exclusive control has expired."); Computer Assocs. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc.,
982 F.2d 693, 696 (2d Cir. 1992) ("Copyright law seeks to establish a delicate equilibrium. On
the one hand, it affords protection to authors as an incentive to create, and, on the other, it must
appropriately limit the extent of that protection so as to avoid the effects of monopolistic stag-
nation."); Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 93, 100 (1997) ("Copyright law seeks to balance the level of incentives to create and
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copyright may encourage. And "access" refers to the deadweight welfare losses
associated with the excess incentives copyright provides.
But lost access is not the only welfare loss that excess incentives impose. The
availability of these excess incentives will also lead to a second type of welfare
loss. Authors and publishers will spend resources competing with each other to
capture them.42 While some of these expenditures may themselves generate social
value, some will not. Some will even reduce social welfare. For example, advertis-
ing and promotion represents on average roughly one-third of the cost of a major
motion picture.4 3 These advertising expenditures are rent-seeking in the sense
that they seek to increase demand for, and thus revenue from, the advertised film.
They may be either socially productive rent-seeking or socially wasteful rent-
seeking. If the expenditures draw additional patrons to the movie, and those pa-
trons derive more satisfaction from watching the advertised movie than they
would have derived from whatever they would have done but-for the advertise-
ments, then the advertising expenditures are socially productive. If, on the other
hand, the expenditures draw additional patrons to the movie, but those patrons
would have derived more satisfaction from whatever they would have done but
for the advertisement-whether watch some other movie or take a hike in the
hills, then the advertising expenditures are socially wasteful.4 4 In the real world,
the interest in maximizing access to information once created. Finding the correct balance be-
tween access and incentives is the central task of copyright policy."); Robert A. Kreiss, Accessi-
bility and Commercialization in Copyright Theory, 43 UCLA L. Rev. 1, 4 (1995) ("To function
properly, copyright law must strike a balance between the rights given to copyright authors
and the access given to copyright users.'). Perhaps the most famous expressions of this balance
belong to two English Lords. In 1785, Lord Mansfield wrote:
[Wie must take care to guard against two extremes equally prejudicial; the one, that
men of ability, who have employed their time for the service of the community, may
not be deprived of their just merits, and the reward of their ingenuity and labour; the
other, that the world may not be deprived of improvements, nor the progress of the
arts be retarded.
Cary v. Longman (1801), 1 East 358, 361 n.b; 102 Eng. Rep. 138, 139 n.b (quoting Sayre v.
Moore (1785) (Mansfield, C.J.)). Nearly sixty years later, Lord Macaulay would repeat these
sentiments in a legislative context:
It is good that authors should be remunerated; and the least exceptionable way of
remunerating them is by a monopoly. Yet monopoly is evil. For the sake of the good
we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not last a day longer than is necessary
for the purpose of securing the good.
Thomas Babington Macaulay, Copyright, in I THE SPEECHES OF MACAULAY 235, 240-41 (1900)
(speech given Feb. 5, 1841).
42. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5, at 24-29; Glynn S. Lunney,Jr., Empir-
ical Copyright: A Case Study of File Sharing, Sales Revenue, and Music Output, 24 SUPREME COURT
EcON. REV. 261 (2016).
43. See Dave Roos, Why Do Movies Cost So Much to Make?, How STUFF WORKS,
https://perma.cc/U5N7-JBWY (archived Dec. 31, 2019).
44. Some advertising expenditures neither increase demand for the product at issue, nor
shift demand from other activities. They are mere vanity. If such vanity expenditures seem un-
likely to occur in the real world, consider the millions spent on Superbowl ads by dot-com
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determining whether expenditures of this sort are productive or wasteful can be
difficult. Nonetheless, when copyright generates excess incentives, it gives copy-
right owners an incentive to make rent-seeking expenditures to capture these ex-
cess incentives even if the expenditures are socially wasteful. For the copyright
owners, rents are rents. So long as the copyright owner expects a positive rate of
return on the advertising expenditure, the expenditure is rational for the copy-
right owner whether the expenditure increases or reduces social welfare.45 Excess
incentives thus encourage socially wasteful rent-seeking by copyright owners. By
doing so, the availability of excess incentives will convert into cost, and thus wel-
fare loss, some of what would otherwise be a mere wealth transfer.4 6
In addition, excess incentives can impose a third type of welfare loss. In some
cases, the excess incentives copyright makes available will become so high that
start-ups that did not last the year. See, e.g., Dashiell Bennett, 8 Dot-Coms That Spent Millions on
Superbowl Ads and No Longer Exist, Bus. INSIDER (Feb. 2, 2011), https://perma.cc/4E58-SDCH.
45. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Rents, 5 WESTERN
EcoN.J. 224 (1967) (showing that the availability of rents will lead to the expenditure of re-
sources to capture them); see also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC
PERSPECTIVE 11 (1976) ("[Ain opportunity to obtain a lucrative transfer payment in the form of
monopoly profits will attract real resources into efforts by sellers to monopolize, and by con-
sumers to prevent being charged monopoly prices."); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Mo-
nopoly and Regulation, 83 J. POL. EcON. 807, 817-20 (1975) (same).
46. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT'S EXCESS, supra note 5, at 26-29. We cannot rely on copyright
owners to spend on advertising only when, and so much as, will prove welfare-enhancing, be-
cause the choice of advertising expenditures can present the Prisoner's Dilemma. Consider a
simplified model. Two films are coming out in theaters this week. There are ten dollars in rents
available that will be split between them. If neither copyright owner spends money on adver-
tising, the rents will be divided evenly. But if one film spends money on advertising and the
other does not, or if one film spends more heavily on advertising than the other, more consum-
ers and hence more rents will go to the more heavily advertised film. To simplify the model, we
can assume that each copyright owner can spend zero or three dollars on advertising. If one
advertises and the other does not, the copyright owner that advertises will capture the full rents
available. The net pay-off for that copyright owner will be seven dollars-the rents available of
ten dollars less the three dollars spent on advertising. If both advertise, the rents will be split
evenly. However, the rents available will be reduced by the total advertising expenditures, from
ten dollars to four, and thus each copyright owner will capture only two dollars in rent. With
this entirely plausible set-up, the decision represents the familiar Prisoner's Dilemma. If neither
advertises, each copyright owner captures five dollars in rents. If one advertises and the other
does not, the advertising copyright owner captures seven dollars in rent and the non-advertis-
ing copyright owner captures none. If both advertise, each copyright owner captures only two
dollars in rents. In this game, it is entirely plausible that both will advertise and thereby convert
60% of the available rents into costs, without any welfare benefit to society. Allowing for the
possibility that advertising will increase the rents available to the two movies does not affect
the conclusion. We would simply need to expand our game to a higher level. For example, film
advertising might increase demand for films but take it from restaurants, television, or Broad-
way shows. Thus, rather than model the game as a choice of advertising expenditures between
two films, we could model the game as a choice of advertising expenditures between films and
restaurants.
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they will push our superstar artists and authors onto the backward-bending por-
tion of the labor supply curve.47 When that happens, these artists and authors will
work less, and their creative output will fall. This may seem counterintuitive. But
let me ask you a simple question: If I gave you 3100 million today, would you go
to work tomorrow? Some of you can honestly say yes to that question, but for
many of you (and for me, as well), the honest answer is no. This is precisely the
question copyright forces our most popular authors and artists to confront. It
gives them vast, life-changing wealth for their first work, often at a very young
age, and then asks them to come to work tomorrow. Yet, as I have shown hap-
pened for the recording industry when sales of recorded music peaked in the
1990s, many of our most successful artists took their riches and stopped coming
to work.4 8 In the recording industry, more money meant fewer and lower quality
hit songs from our top artists and from the recording industry as a whole.4 9
Given this framework of costs and benefits, defining optimal copyright, from
an efficiency or welfare perspective, requires balancing: (i) the marginal social
value from the additional work(s) that any given increase in copyright protection
will ensure at the margins against (ii) the welfare losses that will result from the
excess incentives that additional copyright protection will bestow on non-mar-
ginal works.o In short, additional incentives that ensure the expected profitability
of works at the margins of profitability lead to more and better works for society
47. I first posited this possibility in 2001. See Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note
35, at 890. Mike Scherer provided some evidence for it in connection with the provision of
copyright protection for operas in the 19th century in Europe, focusing on one composer,
Giuseppi Verdi. See F.M. SCHERER, QUARTER NOTES AND BANK NOTES (2012); Frederic M.
Scherer, The Emergence of Musical Copyright in Europe from 1709 to 1850, 5 REv. EcON. RES. ON
COPYRIGHT ISSUES 3, 11 (2008). I presented the first systematic study of it in a study of the
United States recording industry from 1962 through 2015. With the rise of the sound recording
right in the United States in 1971, record sales rose sharply through the 1990s, but this sharply
reduced superstar productivity for the recording industry as a whole in the 1990s. With the rise
of file sharing and the fall of the sound recording copyright beginning in 1999, record sales fell
sharply through the 2000s, but superstar productivity increased. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT'S
EXCESS, supra note 5, at 3-5, 168-69.
48. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5, at 157-71.
49. Id.
50. In its report accompanying the comprehensive revision of the Copyright Act in 1909,
the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives explained this balance:
The enactment of copyright legislation by Congress under the terms of the Con-
stitution is not based upon any natural right that the author has in his writings ... but
upon the ground that the welfare of the public will be served and progress of science
and useful arts will be promoted by securing to authors for limited periods the ex-
clusive rights to their writings.
In enacting a copyright law Congress must consider ... two questions: First,
how much will the legislation stimulate the producer and so benefit the public, and,
second, how much will the monopoly granted be detrimental to the public? The
granting of such exclusive rights, under the proper terms and conditions, confers a
benefit upon the public that outweighs the evils of the temporary monopoly.
H.R. REP. No. 2222, at 7 (1909).
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and thus likely promote social welfare. But excess incentives impose only costs.
Our model thus suggests that the relevant empirical questions we need to answer
are: (i) how much in additional incentives would enacting or expanding copyright
provide for works at the margins of profitability ("marginal" incentives); and
(ii) how much in additional incentives would that same enactment or expansion
provide to works that are already profitable ("excess" incentives). The key balance
then is not incentives versus access, as traditionally understood, but marginal ver-
sus excess incentives.
As a potential alternative to this welfare or efficiency justification, we might
also justify copyright on a natural rights or labor desert basis. In the debates over
copyright's proper scope, proponents of broader, longer, and more effective cop-
yright routinely argue: "Our American society is founded on the principle that the
one who creates something of value is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his labor."5 2
But this notion is often intertwined with efficiency or welfare balancing. As a re-
sult, whether it represents a true alternative to, or a mere rephrasing of, the effi-
ciency justification remains unclear.
The Supreme Court, for example, has, on occasion, articulated a labor-desert
justification for copyright in its opinions. Yet, when it has done so, it has invaria-
bly offered the efficiency justification as well. For example, in Mazer v. Stein, the
Court wrote:
The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of
individual effort by personal gain is the best way to advance public wel-
fare through the talents of authors and inventors in "Science and useful
Arts." Sacrificial days devoted to such creative activities deserve rewards
commensurate with the services rendered.
The second sentence, with its "[s]acrificial days" and "rewards commensu-
rate" language, reflects the labor-desert justification. The first, with its emphasis
on the public welfare, recognizes the welfare or efficiency justification. By juxta-
posing the two, the Court arguably links the labor-desert justification to the effi-
ciency justification: Authors deserve a reward commensurate to the services ren-
dered, and a reward is commensurate to the extent it advances the public welfare.
In Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Fox, the Court used the same approach:
51. I have previously called this balance, the "incentives-access" balance. See Lunney, Cop-
yright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, supra note 21, at 483. That framing is, however, incomplete.
It focuses solely on the lost access, or the deadweight welfare losses, from excess incentives for
non-marginal works. As I have recognized in my more recent work, excess incentives impose
welfare losses from socially wasteful rent-seeking and reduced superstar productivity as well.
Thus, as we shall discuss, a better name might be the "excess-to-marginal incentives" paradigm.
52. Copyright Law Revision: Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 3 of the Committee on the Judi-
ciary, 89th Cong. (1966) (testimony of ElizabethJaneway).
53. Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954).
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The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for
an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to
stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.4
Compared to its opinion in Mazer v. Stein, the Court in its Twentieth Century
Music Corp. opinion reversed the order of the two justifications. The Court of-
fered the labor-desert justification, with its focus on a fair return, first, and the
welfare or efficiency justification, with its focus on the public good, second. Again,
the two are proffered together, as if they are complements to each other, not sub-
stitutes: Afair return is one that stimulates artistic reativity for the general public
good."
In its Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc. decision, the Court made the tie
between the two rationales explicit:
The limited scope of the copyright holder's statutory monopoly, like
the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution, reflects a
balance of competing claims upon the public interest: Creative work is
to be encouraged and rewarded, but private motivation must ultimately
serve the cause of promoting broad availability of literature, music, and
the other arts. The immediate effect of our copyright law is to secure a
fair return for an "author's" creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by this
incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.5 6
As the Sony Court did, academic commentary also ties the labor-desert justi-
fication to the efficiency balance explicitly.7 Generally, in attempting to extend
Locke's labor-desert approach to intellectual property, academic commentators
use Locke's "enough and as good" proviso to incorporate something like an effi-
ciency or welfare balancing into the natural rights approach and thereby turn
Locke into a closet utilitarian." With respect to patent law, for example, Robert
Nozick interpreted the proviso to limit the acquisition of patent rights through
54. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
55. The Court itself has tied the two together. See Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123
(1932) ("The sole interest of the United States and the primary object in conferring the monop-
oly lie in the general benefits derived by the public from the labors of authors.'); Feist Publ's.
Inc., 499 U.S. at 349-50 ("The primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labors of
authors, but '[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."').
56. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431-32 (1984) (quot-
ing Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)).
57. ROBERT NozICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 178-82 (2013); Edwin C. Hettinger,
Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31 (1989); WendyJ. Gordon, A Property Right
in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE
L.J. 1533 (1993); Herman T. Tavani, Locke, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Information Com-
mons, 7 ETHICS & INFO. TECH. 87 (2005).
58. See NOZICK, supra note 57, at 178-82; Hettinger, supra note 57, at 43-35; Gordon, supra
note 57, at 1560-78; Tavani, supra note 57, at 91-96.
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labor to situations where other persons do not suffer thereby any net harm.59 If
we interpret Locke's "enough and as good" proviso to require "no net harm," en-
acting patent or copyright regimes to increase the earnings of inventors or au-
thors is not justified unless the public receives something of at least equal value in
return. Such an interpretation effectively incorporates a Pareto efficiency stand-
ard into the natural rights argument.
The need for considering efficiency or welfare as part of a natural rights or
labor-desert justification for copyright is easy to understand. When the enact-
ment or expansion of copyright satisfies the efficiency balancing, such enactment
or expansion expands the size of the economic pie. With a larger pie, we can give
more to at least one copyright owner without giving less to anyone else. In such a
situation, enacting or expanding copyright can represent a straightforward Pa-
reto improvement. However, when the enactment or expansion of copyright does
not satisfy efficiency balancing, the economic pie is not larger. With the same size
pie, any increase in income for copyright owners must come directly from the
pockets of everyone else.60 To give even one copyright owner a larger share, oth-
ers must receive less. A labor-desert theory cannot justify such a transfer unless it
can preference one form of labor, authorship, over all others.61 Yet, Locke's theory
does not.6 2 As a result, the labor-desert approach must consider welfare or effi-
ciency, even if it may balance or weigh them somewhat differently.
The distributive justice justification for copyright suffers from a similar ina-
bility to stand independently of consequentialist concerns. Even if I might prefer
59. NoZICK, supra note 57, at 178-82. Arguably, a "no net loss" condition for everybody
imposes a much more difficult to satisfy Pareto optimality requirement. For example, assume
that without copyright, only one work will be created and distributed, and that by enacting a
very short and very narrow copyright, ten additional works will be created and distributed.
Under these assumptions, it is quite plausible that the welfare balancing is satisfied. The price
may rise on the one non-marginal work, but the welfare gains from the ten additional works at
the margins could exceed the welfare losses associated with that price increase. Satisfying the
welfare balance does not however satisfy a "no net loss" condition. There may be an individual
who only wants the one, non-marginal work and who derives no pleasure or satisfaction from
the additional ten. In this scenario, the price increase on the one, non-marginal work is, for that
individual, a net loss. Thus, even though enacting copyright would satisfy the efficiency balance,
it would not satisfy the "no net loss" condition.
60. See Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 44-49. As I and others have rec-
ognized, there can be no natural rights claim to the value a person creates through her work
because value in a market economy is invariably jointly created. See Hettinger, supra note 57, at
38 ("Market value is a socially created phenomenon"); Lunney, Copyright's Incentives-Access Par-
adigm, supra note 21, at 574-76 ("Whoever is responsible, factually, for creating the physical
product itself, the value of the product in our market economy will always be joint because it
depends entirely on whether consumers have any 'surplus' resources with which to purchase
the product.').
61. Perhaps, we should, to paraphrase Shakespeare, take it all from the lawyers. But that
is not the way that markets work. That additional income for copyright owners would come
from the pockets of those least able to protect themselves in the market.
62. If anything, Locke would seem to preference physical labor over intellectual labor. See
Tavani, supra note 57, at 89.
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to live in a society where the overall economic pie is slightly smaller, but more
evenly distributed, we do not need an independent heory of distributive justice
to reach that conclusion. Utilitarian analysis, of which efficiency and welfare eco-
nomics are mere branches, can readily incorporate that preference by assuming
that marginal utility decreases with income-an approach commentators have
used to justify, from a utilitarian perspective, progressive taxation.63
Nevertheless, Justin Hughes and Rob Merges have, at least, posited that dis-
tributive justice might deserve independent weight in defining optimal copy-
right.64 In offering distributive justice as an alternative justification for copyright,
Hughes and Merges begin with what they see as the three key questions from a
distributive justice perspective:
Is our copyright system basically fair? Does it exacerbate or ameliorate
the skewed distribution of wealth in our society? Does it do anything at
all for disempowered people, people at the bottom of the socio-economic
hierarchy?65
These questions are both interesting and important. The second, in particu-
lar, ties in closely with popular conceptions of distributive justice, which events
63. All we need assume is a diminishing marginal utility of income, here, as we have done
in debates over income tax. See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Globalization, Tax Competition, and the Fis-
cal Crisis of the Welfare State, 113 HARV. L. REv. 1573, 1649 (2000) ("It is widely accepted that
redistributive income taxation can be justified by considerations of vertical equity and the de-
clining marginal utility of income.'); Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the
Rate Structure: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CALIF. L. REv. 1905, 1905, 1947 (1987) (in-
troducing optimal tax models into the legal literature and noting that such models "assume that
consumption and leisure have declining marginal utility," and that "[tihe assumption that he
value of an additional dollar to an individual declines as the number of dollars he owns in-
creases ('declining marginal utility') is common in economic analysis"); James R. Repetti, De-
mocracy and Opportunity: A New Paradigm in Tax Equity, 61 VAND. L. REv. 1129, 1137-38 (2008)
(stating that "[one] justification for progressive rates under the benefits theory might be based
on the declining marginal utility of money" and noting the conclusions that flow "if we assume
declining marginal utility'). While originally just an assumption, recent work with happiness
surveys tends to support the assumption empirically. See Thomas Griffith, Progressive Taxation
And Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REv. 1363, 1374, 1397 (2004) (noting some problems with happiness
surveys, but concluding that happiness surveys show that "[a]dditional income increases the
utility of the citizens of all nations but has the greatest effect where those citizens are poor,"
and that "[tihe classic notion of declining marginal utility throughout the income distribution
remains sound'); Andrew J. Oswald, On the Curvature of the Reporting Function from Objective
Reality to Subjective Feelings I (IZA Inst. of Lab. Econ. Working Paper No. 3344, 2008) ( "Large
numbers of investigators ... who have estimated subjective well-being regression equations on
individual [happiness] data ... have discovered that allowing for a concave form ... in income
fits reported well-being data better than a linear income term.").
64. Justin Hughes & Robert P. Merges, Copyright and Distributive Justice, 92 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 513 (2017).
65. Id. at 514.
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such as the Occupy Wall Street movement reflect.6 6 Unfortunately, rather than at-
tempt to answer these three questions,6 7 Hughes and Merges are side-tracked by
an observation that among African-Americans in the United States, the richest
are disproportionately associated with industries that copyright protects.6 8 In
particular, they single out the large number of rich African Americans associated
with the music industry to argue that copyright is providing one of the few ave-
nues to material success open to African-Americans. It is not clear what they in-
tend this observation to establish, beyond some general suggestion that copyright
may not be so bad after all.69 While they spill considerable ink explaining uncon-
troversial points, they spend almost none thinking through the logical implica-
tions of shaping law generally in ways that would advance an anti-discrimination
agenda, rather than rely on more targeted anti-discrimination laws. In order to
overcome the horrors of slavery and its terrible and lingering aftermath, should
we make an exception to tort law so that punitive damages are not available in
intentional tort cases if the defendant is African American? Should the improper
acquisition of monopoly power be unlawful unless it is an African American do-
ing it? Or most obviously, given a goal of wealth redistribution, should criminal
law prohibitions on theft not apply to African Americans? These questions are the
logical end of the line of argument Hughes and Merges implicitly advance.70 Yet,
they do not address them. It is not even clear that they recognize that these ques-
tions are the logical end of their observation taken as argument.
Even as applied to copyright, their analysis is unpersuasive. They tout super-
stars in the music industry, in particular, as evidence of how copyright can help
and has helped African Americans. Yet, the music industry is one of the smallest
of the industries copyright protects." Should we keep copyright for musical
66. For an articulation of these distributive justice concerns generally, see THOMAS
PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2017).
67. Hughes and Merges expressly disclaim any attempt to answer the second question,
whether generally or for African Americans as a group specifically: "We should also repeat that
we are not proposing that copyright has wealth redistributive impact for African Americans as
a whole." Hughes & Merges, supra note 64, at 555.
68. Id. at 552-54.
69. They expressly state that their observation is shared to push back against what they
perceive as a rising tide among their academic colleagues to narrow, perhaps radically, copy-
right protection. Id. at 514-15 ("A hefty chunk of this literature has sought to cast doubt on the
need for copyright-or at least copyright in its present form and strength-to generate all the
original expression we have (or want).").
70. At its simplest, the logical principle for which they are arguing seems to be that we
should adapt or enact law generally to improve the situation of African Americans.
71. In the most recent economic census for the year 2009, computer software was the
largest copyright-protected industry by revenue, at $138.7 billion, followed closely by tradi-
tional publishing at $125.0 billion, and the movie picture and video industry at $76.1 billion.
See Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2012, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Aug. 2011),
https://perma.cc/4TD3-RXQK. According to the same census, the sound recording industry
generated a relatively measly $14.8 billion in revenue. Hughes & Merges, supra note 64, at 514-
15.
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works and sound recordings, but abolish it for software, because of differences in
the racial make-up of copyright owners in those industries? If K-pop comes to
displace hip hop and rap in terms of popularity, does copyright for musical works
and sound recordings become unjustifiable as well? Moreover, it is far from clear
that copyright plays a material causal role in the wealth of musical superstars. As
Hughes and Merges themselves recognize,7 2 much of the wealth of superstar re-
cording artists comes from touring and from the exploitation of their fame
through licensing of their publicity rights. Over the last twenty years in partic-
ular, the rise of file sharing, while formally illegally, has sharply reduced the ef-
fective level of copyright protection in the music sector and has sharply reduced
copyright-driven artist income.74 Because of file sharing, the music industry has
had to accept the sale of singles on iTunes and offer works to streaming services
at low per-stream royalty rates." Curious, then, that Hughes and Merges should
pick one of the industries where copyright protection has become least effective
to make their case for copyright.
Even when we limit our focus to copyright's direct beneficiaries, Hughes and
Merges' analysis remains critically incomplete. They focus only on those who
have become superstars. They do not examine how many African Americans have
sought to become superstar recording artists, but failed. To make a serious claim
that copyright helps African Americans, we would need to look at both the win-
ners and losers of the copyright lottery.7 6 Otherwise, one could argue that using
72. Hughes and Merges cite Pete DiCola's Money from Music survey for the proposition
that musicians obtain between 12 and 22% of their income from copyright-based royalties.
Hughes & Merges, supra note 64, at 534. (citing Peter C. DiCola, Money from Music: Survey Evi-
dence on Musicians' Revenue and Lessons About Copyright Incentives, 55 ARIz. L. REv. 301, 304-05
(2013) ("According to my classification of the eight revenue categories, the survey data shows
that, in aggregate, the musicians in our sample earned 12% of revenue from sources directly
related to copyright, 10% from sources with a mixed relationship to copyright, 78% from
sources indirectly related or unrelated to copyright.")].
73. For example, Beyonc6's Lemonade sold only 2.5 million copies in 2016. INT'L FED'N
PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, GLOBAL Music REPORT 2017: ANNUAL STATE OF THE INDUSTRY 9
(2017), https://perma.cc/R3XS-44JJ. By way of contrast, Adele's 25 sold 17.4 million copies in
2015. INT'L FED'N PHONOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY, GLOBAL Music REPORT 2015: ANNUAL STATE OF
THE INDUSTRY 7 (2015), https://perma.cc/5TQC-Q22V. Yet, Forbes estimated Beyonc6's net
worth in 2018 as $355 million. Zack O'Malley Greenburg, Beyonce's Net Worth: $355 Million In
2018, FORBES (Jul. 45, 2018), https://perma.cc/H2BD-J7DL. In contrast, Adele's net worth is es-
timated to be only $180 million in 2018. The Sunday Times Rich List 2019: Adele Net Worth, THE
SUNDAY TIMES (May 12, 2019), https://perma.cc/QZ9V-5FHB (estimating Adele's net worth at
£140 million and converting that to dollars at $1.29 per pound). Beyonc6 is richer than Adele,
not because she sells more records, but because she tours more and is more willing to license
her publicity rights.
74. See Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 74-80.
75. See id. at 75-77.
76. Under Hughes and Merges' approach, a public lottery is not a regressive form of tax-
ation because, if we focus solely on the winners of the lottery, poor people sometimes win. For
a discussion of the "copyright as lottery" argument, see infra text accompanying notes 90-102.
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lotteries to raise public funds is a progressive tax because poor people occasion-
ally win. Yet, Hughes and Merges expressly disclaim any attempt to do so.7 They
do not even address whether African Americans receive a larger share of copy-
right-related income than they do of national income generally.78
In the end, however, Hughes and Merges' attempt to establish distributive
justice as an independent justification for copyright fails because they interpret
distributive justice to incorporate and ultimately depend upon the efficiency bal-
ance. They recognize that distributive justice itself encompasses the risk that
overbroad copyright will force consumers to pay too much for original works of
authorship. They effectively concede that if copyright leads to excessively high
prices and those prices impose undue deadweight welfare losses-losses not off-
set by larger welfare benefits from additional works at the margins-distributive
justice cannot justify copyright.79 Yet, rather than offer evidence on the relative
magnitude of each of these, they simply assume that "the incentive structure made
possible (or made more easily possible) by copyright induces the creation and dis-
tribution of works that improve the position of all levels of the society."o Simi-
larly, they acknowledge that distributive justice itself encompasses the risk that
copyright may over-reward our superstar artists and authors. Again, rather than
offer any evidence on the distribution of copyright-related revenues as between
the superstars and the marginal artists, they again simply assume that most of the
incentives copyright provides flow to the average artists and authors at the mar-
gins of profitability rather than the superstars." Whether they are right or wrong
77. Hughes & Merges, supra note 64, at 555 ("We should also repeat that we are not pro-
posing that copyright has wealth redistributive impact for African Americans as a whole ... ).
78. In this regard, I would note that if we treat all of the wealth for the individuals on the
Hughes and Merges' list as copyright related, the collective estimated wealth of the 25 richest
African Americans totals $14.25 billion. That is a small fraction of the copyright-related wealth
of a single white American in the software industry, Bill Gates. As of January 2019, Forbes es-
timated his net worth at $95.9 billion. See Forbes Profile: Bill Gates, FORBES,
https://perma.cc/597V-293T.
79. Hughes & Merges, supra note 64, at 540-44. On this point, they assert inter alia that
the availability of substitutes will limit deadweight losses. Id. at 542. Yet, a few pages later, they
argue that copyright has helped some African Americans become vastly wealthy. Id. at 552-53.
That they are unable to see the tension between these two is startling.
80. Hughes & Merges, supra note 64, at 541.
81. Id. at 542 ("In those situations, we ask whether the money transferred was more than
needed for creation and distribution of the work. We recognize that there may well be some
'super-stars' of the entertainment business who are earning far more than is needed to induce
their maximum productivity .... On the other hand, there is no evidence that the large cohorts
of creative professionals in middle-income groups are earning more from copyright than is
needed for creation and distribution of original expression."). I thought that how much of cop-
yright's benefit went to superstars versus average artists was one of the questions they promised
to answer. Instead, they simply assume the answer they want. Moreover, they are using the
same trick other copyright maximalists have recently used on this issue. Instead of focusing on
how much of copyright-related revenue flows to the superstars versus the average author or
artist, they use a count of how many people fall in each class. Id at 542 ("large cohorts of creative
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on these issues, the key point is that their principles of distributive justice require
them to address the same concerns the efficiency balance identifies. Thus, to jus-
tify copyright under principles of distributive justice, they must first show, or at
least assert, hat given the additional works it encourages, copyright does not pro-
vide undue excess incentives or impose undue deadweight welfare losses.8 2 Yet, if
this is true, today's copyright is welfare enhancing, and there is no need for dis-
tributive justice or any other alternative or additional justification. If Hughes and
Merges truly believe that distributive justice offers a viable alternative justifica-
tion for copyright, they would do better to make their case on the assumption that
copyright today is welfare-diminishing. If distributive justice is a true alternative,
then it should be able to justify copyright even if copyright fails the efficiency
balance. At the very least, if it is a true alternative, distributive justice should be
able to justify copyright when the efficiency balance is neutral or unclear. Yet,
Hughes and Merges fail to make either of these cases. Their unwillingness or in-
ability to do so consists with one conclusion: Distributive justice does not repre-
sent a true alternative to welfare or efficiency analysis.
For these reasons, I do not believe that either labor desert or distributive jus-
tice offers a true alternative to the welfare balancing justification for copyright.
These theories may (or may not) balance the scales slightly differently from a con-
sequentialist perspective, but they too must weigh whether and to what extent
copyright generates value for society by encouraging the production of additional
original works at the margins. Nevertheless, I am prepared to accept that how
copyright distributes the rents it generates is a relevant concern, particularly
where the welfare balancing is indeterminate or unclear. As a result, to the extent
that copyright distributes its benefits, whether we call them rents or incentives,
in a way that increases substantially the wages of the average artist, I will accept
that as a consideration in copyright's favor.
B. The Distribution of Demand and Hidden Assumptions
Although these three theories emphasize different considerations, they have
one thing in common: Whether copyright can be justified under any of these the-
ories depends upon the distribution of demand between the most popular works
and the least popular works in a given copyright industry. If we want to know if
copyright encourages additional works at the margins or whether copyright helps
the middle-class artist, we need to know how much demand there is for the works
professionals in middle-income groups"). From both a welfare and distributive justice perspec-
tive, if 90% of copyright-related revenues flow to the top 10% of authors and artists, that is a
problem. That that leaves the remaining 90% of authors and artists-a much larger group nu-
merically-to share the remaining 10% of copyright-related revenues does not materially help
the case for copyright from either a welfare or a distributive justice perspective. Hughes and
Merges further suggest that excess incentives for superstar artists and authors are no different
from excessive salaries for "CEOs, physicians, and lawyers." Id. This is a false analogy, as I have
explained elsewhere. See Lunney, Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 34-35, 198 n.6.
82. Hughes & Merges, supra note 64, at 540-44.
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in the middle of the distribution. Unfortunately, we have not historically had in-
formation on how demand is distributed across the full range of works in most
copyright industries. Usually, we have sales or demand figures for a handful of
the most popular works, perhaps the top ten or the top hundred. We may also
know the total number of works produced in a given industry and may know, or
can reasonably assume, that the least-popular works did not sell at all. With these
two end points in the distribution, the question becomes how demand is distrib-
uted across the vast majority of works in the middle.
Lacking data on the distribution of demand for works in the middle, we have
been left with little choice but to make assumptions. For example, among the mu-
sic on Spotify, we know that Ed Sheeran's song Shape of You is the most popular;
it has been streamed 2.008 billion times. We also know that as of 2018 there were
40 million songs on Spotify, and that as of 2013,4 million of those songs had never
been streamed at all. With this limited data as a starting point, if we want to know
how the remaining 36 million songs in the middle fared, our only option is to
make an assumption about how the demand is distributed. We can connect these
two known points with a straight-line, a convex curve, or a concave curve, and if
convex or concave, the curve can be more or less convex or concave.
No one has critically examined which assumption we should adopt in this
context. In that sense, the assumption we have made on this issue has been hidden.
Yet, this hidden assumption is critical to justifying copyright.
To illustrate why, consider the simplest assumption. Let's draw a straight line
connecting the two known Spotify data points. Figure 1 illustrates.
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FIGURE 1. POSSIBLE DISTRIBUTION OF STREAMS ON SPOTIFY: ASSUME LINEARLY
DECLINING DISTRIBUTION OF DEMANDS FOR SONGS BETWEEN MOST POPULAR
SONG AND LEAST POPULAR SONGS.
Known: Ed Sheeran,












Song Rank by Popularity (in millions)
Although we may not realize it, this assumption about how the demands for
the various works of authorship available are distributed plays a critical role in all
of our theoretical justifications for copyright. To illustrate, we begin by dividing
Figure 1 into three categories. At he top, there are the most popular hits, and I
will define that category, in an admittedly somewhat arbitrary fashion, as songs
that fall within the top 10% on Spotify by total stream count-often recorded by
superstars. At the bottom, there are those songs to which no one wants to listen.
I will define this category as the beyond-copyright's-help category for the simple
reason that copyright, no matter how long, broad, and effective, can do nothing
for the earnings associated with these works. And, between these two categories,
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FIGURE 2. SUPERSTARS, MIDDLE-CLASS, AND BEYOND-HELP CATEGORIES:
ASSUMING LINEAR DECLINING DISTRIBUTION OF DEMANDS FOR SONGS BETWEEN
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Although Figure 2 rests on an unproven assumption,3 it illustrates immedi-
ately the most sympathetic vision of copyright-the one many of us have implic-
itly adopted. In this vision, copyright may provide large rents for the most popular
superstars, but it also supports a vibrant middle class of authors and artists. If we
take the number of streams a song receives as a proxy for the incentives that cop-
yright provides for that work, the total Spotify streams under the assumed istri-
bution in Figure 2 is on the order of 3.61E+16 streams.8 4 Under the assumed is-
tribution of demands (or, seen ex post, of actual consumption) in Figure 2, the
incentives that copyright provides are fairly equitably distributed. The superstars
recording these hits do command a somewhat disproportionate share of the
83. Moreover, even from the Spotify data for the top 100 songs which is readily available,
we know that linearly decreasing consumption is not true. The assumption of linearly decreas-
ing consumption predicts that the median work would receive exactly half the streams of the
most popular work. In other words, more than ten million songs on Spotify would have re-
ceived a billion streams. Yet, as of January 2019, the top 100 list revealed fewer than twenty
that have. See List of Most-Streamed Songs on Spotify, WIKIPEDIA, https://perma.cc/2LPL-4C7R
(archived Dec. 24, 2019.)
84. This is the area under the triangle formed by the dashed line. It equals one-half of the
product of the number of streams for the most popular song, at 2.008 billion, and the total
number of songs with more than zero streams, at 36 million.
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streams, and hence, of the rewards copyright provides. Although representing
only 10% of the total song count, they command 20% of the total streams, and
thus likely revenue. Likewise, these payouts create a disproportionate share of the
overall incentives facing artists ex ante; rational artists deciding to record are
likely motivated because they want to record these top hits, not the bottom
misses. Nevertheless, copyright also provides substantial rewards to and incen-
tives via songs recorded by the middle class of non-superstar artists. Representing
80% of the total song count, these "middle class" songs capture 80% of the total
streams. Again, these payouts not only reward those songs' artists but motivate
future recordings. As for the remaining category, under our assumptions,5 cop-
yright provides no reward to or incentives via the remaining 10% of songs that
have never been streamed. These songs' artists are not being rewarded, and future
artists looking to record are not being financially motivated, by such failures.
Although Figure 2 rests on an unproven assumption, it provides one of the
best-case scenarios8 6 for justifying copyright. Most directly, assuming a straight-
line declining distribution of demands for each song, the median song on Spotify
receives one billion streams. Under this assumed distribution, fighting over
whether copyright should force Spotify to pay a higher per-stream royalty mat-
ters, not just for the superstars, but for the average artist as well. It also provides
a strong case for copyright under each of our three justifications. Under the effi-
ciency balancing, we can likely justify at least some level of copyright protection.
While, even with a straight-line declining distribution, copyright undoubtedly
generates excess incentives for superstars creating mass hits, a substantial part of
copyright's incentives flow to middle-class authors and artists, and in that sense,
to works that are likely close to the margins of profitability. Moreover, the rents
for the superstars, while high, are not outrageous. Given this balance of marginal
and excess incentives, there may be some minimal level of copyright protection
for which the welfare gains from the additional works at the margins exceed the
welfare losses associated with the excess incentives. Similarly, that assumed dis-
tribution also provides a basis for arguing for copyright from a labor-desert per-
spective or from a distributive justice perspective. Under this assumed distribu-
tion, it is not just the superstars that copyright benefits but regularJoes andJanes
as well.
However, while presenting a sympathetic case for copyright, Figure 2 rests
on mere assumption. A different assumption changes the picture dramatically. As
a thought experiment, let us assume that the distribution of demand is L-shaped.
A single superstar captures all the streams; no other work receives any. Figure 3
illustrates such an assumption.
85. Recall that in addition to the straight-line decline in consumption, I also assumed that
incentives are proportional to stream count for each work.
86. A stronger case for justifying copyright arises if we connect the stream counts for the
most and least popular songs using a convex curve, bowing strongly outward. The strongest
case for a uniform copyright regime would be a uniform distribution of consumption, where
every song receives the same streams.
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FIGURE 3. ALTERNATIVE DISTRIBUTION OF STREAMS ON SPOTIFY: ASSUME L-
SHAPED DISTRIBUTION OF DEMAND FOR SONGS BETWEEN MOST POPULAR SONG
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Just as we did for Figure 1, we can divide Figure 3 into three categories: (i) su-
perstars; (ii) middle-class artists; and (iii) artists beyond copyright's help. For the
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FIGURE 4. SUPERSTARS, MIDDLE-CLASS, AND BEYOND-HELP CATEGORIES:
ASSUMING L-SHAPED DISTRIBUTION OF DEMAND FOR SONGS BETWEEN MOST
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Figure 4 presents a far less flattering portrait of copyright than Figure 2.
While in Figure 2 the superstars command a somewhat disproportionate share of
copyright's rewards, in Figure 4, a single superstar, Ed Sheeran, commands all of
them-and likewise represents all of the incentives copyright creates for tomor-
row's artists deciding whether to record based on today's consumption. With an
L-shaped distribution of demand, copyright's supposed middle class disappears
entirely. In Figure 4, the market is divided entirely between the top and bottom
categories. Artists are either superstars, and so do not need copyright. Or they are
flops to whom no one wants to listen, and so are beyond copyright's help.
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While the hypothetical extreme of an L curve is merely assumed at this
point," the implications for copyright if it is accurate are staggering. Most di-
rectly, it suggests that fighting over Spotify per-stream royalties in an attempt to
help the average artist is a complete waste of time-whether as ex ante encour-
agement or as ex post charity or redistribution. With an L curve, the average song
on Spotify receives no streams. Ten percent more of nothing remains nothing.
More generally, if the distribution of demand for copyrighted works of author-
ship resembles an L, then copyright becomes impossible to justify under any of
our theoretical perspectives.
Under an efficiency or welfare approach, copyright's incentives are entirely
misdirected. They flow entirely to a single, or more realistically, a relative handful
of, superstars. None flow to a marginal work. In the face of an L-shaped distribu-
tion of demand, copyright is unlikely to encourage the production of even a single
additional work for two reasons. First, even in the absence of copyright, a super-
star will likely earn a sufficient return to cover his or her costs. Market mecha-
nisms, such as lead-time advantage and reputational rents, will likely ensure the
profitability of the most popular works even in the absence of copyright. This is
particularly true in the music industry where a complementary and rivalrous"
product-live concerts-provides a substantial revenue stream.8 9 Second, with an
L-shaped distribution, Marshall's superstar model likely applies and suggests that
the market will oversupply superstars even in the absence of copyright. In the
superstar model, when a new and slightly better superstar comes along, he or she
displaces the demand for the old superstar and captures the entire market. Be-
cause the new superstar is slightly better than the old, he or she may expand over-
all demand in the market slightly. Primarily, however, the new superstar captures
demand by displacing the old, preexisting superstar. Given a choice between lis-
tening to their favorite artist or song, or to their second favorite, consumers listen
to their favorite, even if their preference is only slight. In such a case, the super-
star's private return is a function of the size of the market as a whole, both the
87. Just as we know from the top 100 list that the straight-line declining distribution of
demand model is not accurate, so too we also know that the hypothetical extreme of a true L
curve, where one superstar commands all of the streams, is not accurate. See List of Most-
Streamed Songs on Spotify, supra note 83 (noting that the 100th most popular song on Spotify, as
of January 23, 2019 was Zayn's Pillowtalk and listing its total stream count as 686 million).
Nevertheless, like perfect competition, the L curve remains a useful, if theoretical, basis for
comparison. Moreover, even if we know that one superstar does not command all the demand,
it may be the case that a handful of superstars do.
88. As is well-known in the literature, consumption of works of authorship is non-rival.
My decision to listen to a recording of a song does not limit your ability to listen to it as well.
Most real and personal property, on the other hand, concern rival goods. If I occupy a seat at a
concert, you physically cannot occupy the same seat. Markets, with well-defined property
rights, work well, and in theory can achieve Pareto optimal outcomes, for rival goods. Markets,
even with well-defined property rights, work poorly and fail to achieve a Pareto optimal out-
come for most non-rival goods.
89. Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 77 (noting that concert revenue rose,
according to Pollstar, from $2.3 billion ($2013) in 2000 to $5.1 billion in 2013).
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expansion in demand and the displacement of the preexisting demand. Yet, the
marginal social value the superstar creates is a function only of the slight expan-
sion in the overall market demand. In such a case, the private return for the new
superstar typically exceeds, often by several orders of magnitude, the marginal
social value the new superstar creates.90
Consider a simple example. A consumer has a favorite holiday song. He val-
ues and is willing to pay one dollar to listen to that song. Then, Mariah Carey
comes along and releases her recording of All I Want for Christmas is You.91 The
consumer likes Ms. Carey's song better, but only slightly better. He values listen-
ing to it at $1.01. In this situation, for this consumer, the marginal social value
created by Ms. Carey's song is one cent. That is the increase in value or satisfac-
tion, and hence increased willingness to pay, the consumer has for the new song.
This is the value, satisfaction, or willingness to pay that would be lost for this con-
sumer had the new song never been authored or released. For Ms. Carey's reward
to match the marginal value created, she should receive one cent from this con-
sumer. But, often, in markets, she will receive something closer to the consumer's
full, rather than marginal, value. Given a choice between paying one dollar and
continuing to listen to the old song, or paying that same dollar and listening to
Ms. Carey, the consumer will choose to pay a dollar in order to listen to Ms.
Carey. In receiving a dollar from that consumer, the private value Ms. Carey cap-
tures far exceeds the marginal social value she played a role in creating.92 She cap-
tures something close to the consumer's full, rather than marginal, value for the
song.
The market thus likely overpays superstars relative to the marginal value they
create. In such a superstar market, there is no need for copyright. Because the
private return for such a superstar exceeds the marginal social value she creates,
the market will, even in the absence of copyright, overinvest in and overproduce
such artists. For this reason, and also because superstars can likely recoup their
costs even without copyright, the additional incentives copyright provides such a
superstar are entirely unnecessary to efficient creative output and are unlikely to
encourage the creation of even a single additional work. In the face of an L-shaped
distribution of demand, copyright provides no encouragement to marginal works
90. Id. at 36 ("The superstar model thus predicts a gap between the private and social value
of be-coming a superstar. A superstar will earn more than the value they create.').
91. Amy X. Wang, Mariah Carey Song From 1994 Breaks Music Streaming Record, ROLLING
STONE (Dec. 26, 2018), https://perma.cc/X577-8SDJ. On December 24, 2018, Ms. Carey's song
broke the record on Spotify for the most streams in a single day. Id.
92. See supra text accompanying notes 29-50. Ms. Carey did not create the market value
of her song on her own. As I and others have recognized, value in a market economy is invari-
ably jointly created. Hettinger, supra note 57, at 38 ("Market value is a socially created phenom-
enon"); Lunney, Copyright's Incentives-Access Paradigm, supra note 21, at 574-76 ("Whoever is re-
sponsible, factually, for creating the physical product itself, the value of the product in our
market economy will always be joint because it depends entirely on whether consumers have
any 'surplus' resources with which to purchase the product.").
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and therefore provides no benefit to society. Yet, increasing the rents our super-
star captures likely entails substantial welfare losses. These losses would include:
(i) deadweight losses; (ii) rent-to-cost conversion losses; and (iii) potentially re-
duced output by our superstar.9 3 Thus, under an L-shaped distribution of de-
mand, copyright is all cost and no benefit. From a welfare or efficiency perspec-
tive, copyright cannot be justified.
Similarly, in the face of an L-shaped distribution of demand, copyright also
cannot be justified under a labor-desert heory. As mentioned at the outset, su-
perstar artists already earn more from a single hit than the average college-edu-
cated American earns in a lifetime of forty-hour weeks.9 4 Moreover, as the Ma-
riah Carey example suggests, under the superstar model, superstars also earn
more, usually far more, than the marginal social value they play a role in creating.
In other words, they are already capturing a disproportionate share of society's
wealth. If the goal is to ensure authors a "fair return" or a "reward commensurate"
with the marginal social value they create, superstar authors can capture far more
than that even without copyright. Even assuming arguendo that middle-class au-
thors and artists need copyright o earn such a fair return, for that to justify cop-
yright, there must be a meaningful middle class of authors and artists that copy-
right benefits. In the face of an L-shaped distribution of demand, however, there
are no middle-class authors.
In the face of an L-shaped distribution of demand, copyright also cannot be
justified from a distributive justice perspective. With an L-shaped distribution of
demand, copyright takes from the relatively less well-off, copyright consumers,
to give to the relatively better off, superstar artists and authors.9 5 Such a redistri-
bution would be exactly the opposite of what distributive justice requires. Even if
the superstar comes from a historically oppressed group, that happenstance at a
particular time and particular place in a particular copyright industry cannot pro-
vide a firm foundation for an enduring world-wide copyright regime.
In the face of an L curve, there is in truth only one possible argument for
copyright: copyright as lottery. In the lottery story, offering very high returns for
the most popular works, coupled with uncertainty over which works will prove
the most popular, creates a type of lottery that attracts the best and most talented
would-be authors into the market and thereby increases creative output.9 6 The
Stationers' Guild initially articulated, and Paul Goldstein later picked up, the lot-
tery story, but they both offered it as a descriptive observation, not a normative
93. See supra text accompanying notes 29-50.
94. See supra text accompanying note 5.
95. Determinations of Royalty Rates and Terms for Ephemeral Recording and Webcast-
ing Digital Performance of Sound Recordings (Web IV), 81 Fed. Reg. 26,316. While an argu-
ment can be made that consumers voluntarily choose to pay that price, I reject this argument.
As the Copyright Royalty Board has stated: "[N]either sellers nor buyers can be said to be 'will-
ing' partners to an agreement if they are coerced to agree to a price through the exercise of
overwhelming market power." Id. at 26,331.
96. Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 879-80.
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proposition.9 7 They argued that publishers needed to capture rents on the most
popular works to cover their losses on works that proved unexpectedly less pop-
ular.9 8 By tying the excess profits to the risk of losses, both tried to turn a flaw into
a feature.
Even as a descriptive observation, the lottery story is not entirely accurate.
The extreme wealth that copyright helps superstars capture, and that Hughes and
Merges perversely tout as evidence of distributive justice,9 9 establishes that not all
of copyright's excess incentives are being used to cover the costs of less popular
works.
As a normative proposition, it is even more problematic. First, even if max-
imizing the reward for the winners in such a winner-takes-all market led to better
"winners," it is not clear that society would be better off as a result. It would de-
pend on how much additional investment a larger prize attracted and how much
marginal social value that additional investment created. Marshall's superstar
model offers a cautionary tale regarding such markets.10 0 Because the marginal
private value of winning in a superstar market will often far exceed the marginal
social value a superstar creates, scarce resources will be devoted to the effort of
becoming a superstar, even when those resources would generate greater societal
satisfaction if devoted elsewhere in the economy. Using a government interven-
tion such as copyright to maximize the reward in such a market would merely
exacerbate this inefficiency. Second, it is a just-so story, requiring precisely the
right amount of uncertainty over which works will prove popular. Too much un-
certainty, and it becomes self-defeating.10 ' Too little, and works of authorship are
97. Paul Goldstein, Copyright, 55 L. & CONTEMP. PROBs. 79, 83 (1992) ("A robust copyright,
by contrast, will mix the hope of high return on some works with risk of loss on others, giving
publishers, if not quite a lottery, then at least a portfolio that will promote investment and sus-
tain a wider variety of authorship than could command support under any other legal system.').
I would note that this argument is also not new. The Stationers' Guild offered the argument in
its 1586 petition to the Star Chamber:
Also priviledges, are occasion, that many bookes are nowe prynted, which are more
beneficial to the common welth, then proffitable to the prynter, for the Patentee be-
inge benefeted otherwise by Bookes of profitable sale is content to bestowe parte of
his gayne in other bokes, which are within the compas of his patent, verie beneficiall
for the common welth, and yet suche whereby the printer shall scarse reape the Tenth
parte of his charge: which Bookes wolde never be prynted if privileges were revoked.
STATIONERS' COMPANY, A TRANSCRIPT OF THE REGISTERS OF THE COMPANY OF STATIONERS OF
LONDON: 1554-1640 A.D., supra note 20, at 805.
98. Id.
99. See Hughes & Merges, supra note 64, at 552-59.
100. For the sources on Marshall's superstar model, see supra note 7.
101. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5, at 50-51 (pointing out that that if out-
comes are completely uncertain, production decisions would be based on whether the average
work out of all potential works was expected to be profitable; as a result, if one work were
produced in such a world without copyright, all would be produced).
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no different from any other risky investment.10 2 History and empirics both sug-
gest that the risk and uncertainty associated with authorship are not just-so.103 At
the start of 2019, it was unclear whether Avengers: Endgame, Star Wars: Episode IX,
or The Lion King would capture the box office title for 2019. However, even then,
it was always clear that Happy Death Day 2U was never going to be the top film.
For the lottery story to hold true, every work must have some chance at the top
rewards. But that is simply not true. Most would-be recording artists have no
chance at becoming the next Taylor Swift. While there may be uncertainty as to
who will, so long as industry players can sort potential artists into categories of
more-or-less likely to succeed, increasing the prize for the most likely to become
breakout stars will not trickle down and support investment in those less likely
to break out.
Consider a simple model. At the cost of $1, a videogame company or record
label can bring a game or song to market. If the game or song proves popular, it
will have a potential value of one million dollars. While they do not have perfect
information as to which will prove the most popular, the company or label can
sort the potential games or songs into one of three categories: (i) 1 in 100 chance
of proving popular; (ii) 1 in 10,000 chance of proving popular; or (iii) 1 in
1,000,000 chance of proving popular. Copyright can be tailored to provide rents
in any amount from one dollar to one million dollars for a hit. To ensure a suffi-
cient incentive for games or songs that fall in the first category, copyright must
ensure that the owner can capture 3100 in rents through the market. That is the
award that precisely matches expected return and cost and thereby enables the
102. See Breyer, supra note 33, at 297-98; Lunney, Copyrights Incentives-Access Paradigm, su-
pra note 21, at 582 n.358; see also Mitzi M. Montoya-Weiss & Roger Calantone, Determinants of
New Product Performance: A Review and Meta-Analysis, 11 J. PRODUCT INNOVATION MGMT. 397
(1994) (summarizing studies of new product introductions that report success rates from 38 to
68%); Robert Prentice, Vaporware: Imaginary High-Tech Products and Real Antitrust Liability in a
Post-Chicago World, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1163 (1996) (noting that 80% of new products in the high-
tech field fail).
103. Historically, the success rate on books fell as copyright expanded. Lunney, Copyrights
Incentives-Access Paradigm, supra note 21, at 613 n.425 (noting that the success rates on books
dropped from one in three in 1643 to one in five by 1878). That book publishers could exist
and earn a profit under these various legal regimes establishes that they could separate projects
by expected return and thus had a pretty good sense for which books were most likely to do
well. In the recording industry, the sequential release of singles from an album and the fact that
only some tracks are released as singles suggest the industry has a pretty good sense for which
singles consumers are likely to prefer. I have confirmed empirically that Taylor Swift, for ex-
ample, did a near-perfect job of predicting and releasing singles in the order of their popularity
from her seven studio albums. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT'S EXCESS, supra note 5, at 51-53. I have
also shown empirically that the fraction of new artists who proved to be one-hit wonders on
the Billboard Hot 100 chart remained roughly constant for more than 50 years, with very little
variation, and that in the 1990s, the top 10 best-selling albums averaged 2.7 Hot 100 hits on
them, again with very little variation. Id. at 107, 189-91. Again, the consistent average and the
low variance in both cases tends to confirm that the recording industry has a pretty good sense
of what will prove popular on average. Of course, surprises will occur, but that is also true for
products not protected by copyright. Consider the pet rock and Beanie Babies fads.
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copyright owner to recoup her persuasion costs. For the second, copyright must
ensure 310,000 in rents, and for the third, one million in rents. If we expand cop-
yright to provide 31,000 in rents for all of the games or songs, then the game com-
pany or record label will expect the works in the first category to prove profitable,
indeed, very profitable,104 but the works in the second and third category will re-
main unprofitable. With $1,000 in rents, a rational profit-maximizing firm will
cross-subsidize losing works in the first category because it is unable to distin-
guish ex ante the 1 success from the 99 failures. Yet, the excess incentives are un-
necessary to ensure such cross-subsidization within the first category. A rational
firm would engage in the same cross-subsidization if the rents for the success
were only 3100. More importantly, for our purposes, even providing excess in-
centives for the first category will not lead a rational profit-maximizing firm to
invest in or cross-subsidize works in the second and third category. Even with
the higher award, the expected return on works in the second and third categories
remains negative. True, we could increase the award to $10,000 for all works.
With such an award, the expected return will precisely match the cost for works
in the second category, and they will, as a result, be produced. That is not, how-
ever, due to cross-subsidization from the excess profits for the works in the first
category, but because with the higher award, the expected return precisely
matches cost for works in the second category and thereby enables the copyright
owner to recoup her persuasion costs. Again, there will be cross-subsidization
between the winners and losers within the first and second categories because the
firm is unable ex ante to separate the 1 winner from the 99 losers in the first cat-
egory, or the 1 winner from the 9,999 losers in the second. However, none of the
excess profits from the first category will trickle down to works in the third cat-
egory. The expected return from the third category works remains negative, and
they will not be produced.
Third, even if the lottery story held true, it conflicts directly with the labor-
desert and distributive justifications for copyright. For the story to hold true,
there must be tens, if not hundreds or thousands, of losers for every winner of the
copyright lottery.105 In the lottery story, starving artists are not a problem copy-
right seeks to solve. They are a problem that copyright knowingly tolerates.
In the end, however, whether maximizing the award copyright provides for
becoming a superstar leads to more and better works is a question that cannot be
resolved as a matter of theory. It must be tested empirically. Fortunately, the rise
of file sharing in the early 2000s in the recording industry offers a natural exper-
iment that allows us to do so. From the 1960s to the 1990s, revenues from the
sales of recorded music in the United States rose from under $4 billion in constant
2013 dollars (or $2013) in 1961 to over $20 billion (32013) in 1999.106 With the
rise of file sharing, revenues began to fall and fall sharply. By 2014, they were
104. If copyright enables the owner to capture $1,000 in rents from the works in the first
category, the expected return on such works is $10 for every dollar invested.
105. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5, at 54-56.
106. Id.
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under $7 billion.10 7 With this rise and fall in revenue, we can test whether offering
larger prizes for becoming the next superstar led to more and better music.
As I have comprehensively shown elsewhere, the lottery story proved false
for the recording industry over the last fifty years.108 Revenues peaked for the re-
cording industry in the late 1990s.1 09 According to the lottery story, those very
high revenues hould have attracted the absolute best new artists and ensured so-
ciety the best new music, but they did not.110 In fact, the exact opposite occurred.
As revenues rose and the prize for a hit soared, both the productivity of our top
artists and the overall output of high-quality new music fell."' For example, in
1964, record sales in the United States were just over $5 billion in constant 2013
dollars (32013).112 In that year, the top ten new artists collectively had a total of
273 Billboard Hot 100 hits as lead artist1 3 in the first ten years of their careers.1 14
In 2006, after the file-sharing era, record sales were 313.8 billion ($2013)." The
top ten new artists from that year had 205 Billboard Hot 100 hits as lead artist in
the first ten years of their careers.1 16 In 1999, when sales revenue peaked at $20.7
billion ($2013), the top ten new artists had only 145 such hits in the first ten years
of their careers.'1 7 Moreover, I cite the data for these three years only as illustra-
tions of the broader point. For new artists who had their first Billboard Hot 100
hit from 1962 through 2006, there was a negative and statistically significant cor-
relation between their productivity and revenue." More money meant fewer hit
songs.
In short, there is simply no coherent theory that would support copyright in
the face of an L-shaped distribution of demand. Copyright thus becomes impos-
sible to justify if the distribution of demand for works of authorship resembles an
L. So far, though, I have merely postulated the L curve as a hypothetical possibil-
ity. To determine whether that possibility is real, we turn now to the newly avail-
able data on the actual distribution of demand in the videogame industry.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 116-18,168-69.
109. Id. at 81-82.
110. Id. at 116-18. (showing that after adjusting for the age of the music, consumers
streamed music from the 1990s the least on Spotify in 2014).
111. LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5.
112. Id.at68.
113. I exclude appearances as a featured artist. Productivity is work per unit time. Appear-
ances as lead and featured artist entail different levels of time and effort. I do not group them
together.
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III. PROVING THE L CURVE: THE VIDEOGAME INDUSTRY
Although a relatively new form of authorship and a late comer to copyright,
the videogame industry has become an important copyright sector. According to
industry reports, the estimated revenue from videogame software sales in 2017
for the United States videogame industry was $30.4 billion.119 That is more than
(i) the box office revenues for the motion picture industry, at roughly 311 billion
in the United States in 2017,120 and (ii) the sales of recorded music, at roughly $8.7
billion in the United States in 2017,121 combined. In the videogame industry,
Steam offers the leading platform for the digital distribution for PC videogames.
In 2013, Steam was estimated to hold 75% of the market for such digital distribu-
tion.122 By 2017, users purchasing games through Steam totaled roughly $4.3 bil-
lion and represented at least 18% of global PC game sales.123 By October 2018, the
service had over 90 million active registered accounts124 with a peak of 17.4 mil-
lion concurrent users online over a 48 hour period fromJanuary 21 throughJan-
uary 22, 2019.125
Although Steam undoubtedly has detailed information on the precise distri-
bution of demand among the roughly thirty thousand games it offers through its
platform,126 it has not shared that data. While Steam Gauge and Steam Spy, inde-
pendent third-party services, have offered estimates of the number of players for
these games, their approaches relied on random sampling of a small portion of
the Steam player base.12 7 We could not be entirely sure that their estimates were
reliable and accurate.
119. U.S. Video Game Sales Reach Record-Breaking $43.4 Billion in 2018, ENT. SOFTWARE AsS'N
(Jan. 23, 2019), https://perma.cc/7YKR-CN8H (showing videogame software sales for 2017 of
$30.4 billion).
120. MOTION PICTURE AsS'N OFAM., THEME REPORT 15 (2017) ("In 2017, US/Canada box
office was $11.1 billion, down 2% from the record high of $11.4 billion in 2016").
121. RECORDING INDUSTRY Ass'N OF AM., NEWS AND NOTES ON 2017 RIAA REVENUE STATISTICS
1 (2018) ("In 2017 revenues from recorded music in the United States increased 16.5% at esti-
mated retail value to $8.7 billion, continuing the growth from the previous year.").
122. Cliff Edwards, Valve Lines Up Console Partners in Challenge to Microsoft, Sony,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 4, 2013), https://perma.cc/N9K8-KACH.
123. Dustin Bailey, With $4.3 Billion in Sales, 2017 Was Steam's Biggest Year Yet, PCGAMESN
(Mar. 22, 2018), https://perma.cc/AZ24-GBGV.
124. See Liz Lanier, Steam Now Has One Billion Accounts (And 90 Million Active Users), VARIETY
(Apr. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/NA2B-FP76.
125. Steam itself presents data on a running 48 hour count of peak and current concurrent
Steam users. ForJanuary 21-22, 2019, the peak concurrent usage was 17.4 million users. Steam
& Game Stats, STEAM (Jan. 22, 2019), https://perma.cc/DKH5-WDBM.
126. Jonathan Bolding, Steam Now Has 30,000 Games, PC GAMER (Jan. 13, 2019),
https://perma.cc/B2ZQ-9GUC.
127. See Kylie Orland, Valve Leaks Steam Game Player Counts; We Have The Numbers, ARS
TECHNICA (July 6, 2018), https://perma.cc/QR94-8CKW.
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In the summer of 2018, however, data regarding the distribution of demand
for the videogames on Steam was available through a backdoor.1 28 Until Steam
changed its API in earlyJuly 2018, Steam's API made available to sixteen decimal
places the percentage of game players who had accomplished developer-defined
achievements in those games which featured developer-defined achievements.12 9
(Not all games include such achievements.) With such a precise percentage, often
for multiple achievements within a single game, it became possible to calculate,
with precision and accuracy, the total number of Steam users who had played each
game, at least for those games that included developer-defined achievements.1 3 0
While Steam's own website displayed and continues to display the percentage of
players who have reached the various achievements, it reports that percentage to
only two decimal places. 131 That is not helpful for estimating accurately overall
player counts. With only two decimals, we can usually find a fairly low common
denominator for the achievement percentages. From that lowest common de-
nominator, all we can say is that the total number of players are at least as high as
that lowest common denominator. But they could be much higher. They could be
any multiple of that lowest common denominator.1 3 2
With sixteen decimals, however, we can be much more precise. If the per-
centage of players who reach a certain achievement is 0.01278220716762267%,
and the number of players who have reached that achievement and who have
played the game both have to be whole numbers, one possible solution that would
yield that percentage is that eight players out of 62,587 reached the achieve-
ment.13 3 If there are twelve other developer-defined achievements for the same
game, that enables us to calculate a very precise estimate of the number of players
for each game. As mentioned, Steam changed its API in July 2018 to make the
sixteen-decimal-place percentage data unavailable. Fortunately, before it did, Ty-
lel Glaiel wrote and posted a script to convert the achievement percentages for
each game into a player count for that game.1 34 He also notified Steam Spy of the
approach, and Sergey Galyonkin plugged the script and the available data into
128. Id.
129. Id. A developer can define an achievement for accomplishing any task within the
game, from chopping so much wood, raising so many sheep, to winning the game in particular
ways. Each achievement provides ome measure of the time a player has spent playing and the
skill with which the player has played the game.
130. See Tyler Glaiel, Using Achievement Stats To Estimate Sales on Steam (Jun. 29, 2018),
https://perma.cc/V944-4FPC.
131. See Orland, supra note 127.
132. For example, when we round to two decimals, if a game has three developer-defined
achievements, and the percentage of players who achieved the three achievements are 50.00%,
33.33% and 25.00% then we know at least twelve people have played the game. That is the low-
est common denominator into which two, three, and four all divide. Unfortunately, that is not
much help because the overall player count for that game could be twelve, twenty-four, thirty-
six, or any other multiple of twelve. With only two decimal places, there is simply no way to
know for sure.
133. Orland, supra note 127.
134. Id.
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Steam Spy's machine learning algorithm to calculate player counts for each of the
games with developer-defined achievements. 13 5 After Galyonkin did so, and with
his consent, Ars Technica posted the resulting estimates of game players for the
13,281 games on Steam that included developer-defined achievements.136
This provides our first publicly available data revealing the shape of the dis-
tribution of demand for the full range of copyrighted works in a given copyright
sector. Figure 5 presents the resulting estimates of game players for these 13,281
videogames.
FIGURE 5. ESTIMATED PLAYER COUNT FOR 13,281 STEAM-DISTRIBUTED
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As Figure 5 illustrates, for these videogames, we have data not merely for the
top game, Team Fortress 2, with over fifty million players, and the least popular
game, actually a tie between four games with three players each, but also for every
game in between. 13' As a result, we do not need to make assumptions about how
the players are distributed among these games. We have precise estimates of the
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players among these games is not precisely L-shaped, it comes very close. Cer-
tainly, it is far closer to an L-shaped distribution than it is to the linear distribu-
tion we have commonly and subconsciously assumed. In Figure 5, a relative hand-
ful of super-popular games in copyright's tall peak command virtually all the
demand. The vast majority of games in copyright's short tail have, relatively
speaking, no players at all.
This has enormously important implications for copyright, but before ex-
ploring the data and those implications further, a few caveats are in order. The
data has limitations. It is a snapshot in time of players for one sector, PC video-
games, of one copyright industry. It includes only those games available on Steam,
and so excludes some of the most popular games, such as Fortnite.1 3 ' Even for the
games available on Steam, the method for estimating the number of players works
only for those games that include developer-defined achievements. As a result, we
have player estimates for "only" 13,281 games out of Steam's catalog of roughly
138. This likely reduces the skew in the distribution of demand in the Steam data. Only
the most popular games can afford to host their game on their own services. Less popular games
do not have the same economies of scale and so are more likely to use a service such as Steam.
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30,000 games.1 3 9 In addition, the denominator for players does not seem to cor-
respond exactly to the "players" statistic provided to individual developers.1 4 0 The
denominator also does not count individuals who have purchased the game, but
not played it. 1 41 And "in very rare cases, this method could come up with a de-
nominator that's off by a factor of two, thanks to common factors (though this
chance becomes vanishingly small in games with more than a few Achieve-
ments)."1 42 In addition, at least some of the games are multiplayer, and so network
effects may be stronger for these games than for other types of copyrighted works.
In the end, though, whatever its weaknesses, the data in Figure 5 represents
the first and only real-world data we have concerning the distribution of demand
across a substantial range of works in any copyright industry. Certainly, it is far
better than mere assumption. The highly skewed distribution of demand for PC
videogames visible in Figure 5 may also be present for other works of authorship.
139. Steam also releases alive, and peak 48-hour, player count for its top 100 games. While
the top 100 is not quite as L-shaped as Figure 5, it too comes close to L-shaped. Figure 6 pre-
sents this data for the current player count at 10:15 a.m. onJanuary 22, 2019.
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Steam & Game Stats, supra note 125. The player count on Figure 5 is much higher than that in
Figure 6. This is because the achievement percentages in Figure 5 are based all players that have
ever played the game. Figure 6 in contrast is a current player count at a moment in time.
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For example, if we model the distribution of demand for current videogame play-
ers on the top 100 games on Steaml43 using exponential decay,144 and use regres-
sion analysis to estimate the decay coefficient,145 the model fits well, with an ad-
justed R2 of 0.879, and we find a statistically significant decay coefficient of -
1,657.56 (p<0.0001). If we use the same approach for the top 100 most popular
songs of all time on Spotify, the exponential decay function continues to fit well,
with an adjusted R2 of 0.884, and we find again a statistically significant, but much
higher, decay coefficient of -575,857 (p<0.0001). At least for the top 100 Spotify
songs of all time, the distribution of demand for the Spotify songs appears to share
the exponential decay we see in Figure 5 for PC videogames. The only difference
is that as we move from most popular to least popular by percentile popularity,
streaming on Spotify decays much more rapidly across the top 100 songs than
does player count on Steam across the top 100 games.146 While we do not have
the data on the distribution of demand across Spotify's full catalog, such that this
analysis covers only the top 100 songs on Spotify, it suggests that the distribution
of demand for music resembles that for games in Figure 5. Indeed, to the extent it
departs from that shape, the exponential decay we find in demand for the top 100
songs suggests that, at least on Spotify, the demand for music comes even closer
to L-shaped than does the demand for PC videogames in Figure 5.
I recognize, of course, that this does not prove that the distribution of de-
mand in Figure 5 is representative of demand across Spotify's full catalog, let
alone across copyrighted works generally. The distribution of demand for PC
videogames we see in Figure 5 may be idiosyncratic. Popularity and other net-
work effects may be stronger for PC videogames than for other copyrighted
143. See note 139 supra.
144. In an exponential decay model, demand decreases exponentially. We can model the
decay as: In (Dt/D, ) = -At, where D, is the demand for the t-th percentile most popular work,
D1 is the demand for the most popular work, A is the decay factor. Ordinarily, in exponential
decay, t represents time, but here I will use it for percentile popularity of the work at issue.
Thus, rather than decrease with time exponentially, as in a natural exponential decay, here I
will model demand, whether number of players or streams, as decreasing exponentially as the
popularity of a work moves from most popular to least.
145. The regression model is: y = Ax, where y = In 01) xis the game or song's popular-
ity rank minus one, divided by the total number of games or songs in the catalog, and A is the
estimated decay coefficient.
146. Thus, in the Spotify top 100, the second most popular song of all times has 79.4% of
the streams of the most popular song and the third most popular has 71.2%. In contrast, in the
Steam data in Figure 5, the second most popular game has 92.3% of the players that the most
popular game has, and the third most popular has 72.9%. Moreover, comparing second- and
third-most popular games between the two is not precisely apples-to-apples. We have data
from Steam only for the 13,281 games with developer defined achievements. Spotify has forty
million songs. See supra note 10. Thus, if we rank works by percentile popularity rather than
numerical rank, the second- and third-most popular games on Steam are four orders of mag-
nitude further along the percentile rank popularity curve than the second- and third-most pop-
ular songs on Spotify.
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works. The minimum cost to enter the market may also be lower, allowing a PC
game to be profitable with a player count much lower than could, for example, a
feature film. Nevertheless, it is the only data we have that illustrates a nearly com-
plete distribution of demand across any copyrighted industry. Rather than hope
that the distribution proves idiosyncratic, we should consider the implications for
copyright in the event that Figure 5 provides an accurate representation of the
distribution of demand for works of authorship generally. In doing so, the first
issue is to define more precisely where the actual distribution we see in Figure 5
falls between our two assumed distributions: (i) linearly declining; and (ii) L-
shaped. While there are a number of statistical measures we could use, I will ex-
plore three.
First, we can calculate the Gini coefficients for the two distributions. Italian
sociologist Corrado Gini first proposed the coefficient in 1912 as a statistical
measure of equal distribution.147 Today, it is commonly used as a measure of in-
come inequality. As a general rule, the Gini coefficient runs from zero to one (or
to 100%). With perfect equality in income distribution, each citizen in a society
earns exactly the same amount. With such perfect equality, the Gini coefficient is
zero. There is no inequality. In contrast, with perfect inequality, one citizen earns
everything, and everyone else earns nothing. In such a society, the Gini coefficient
would be 1% or 100%. Today, the most common use of the Gini coefficient is as a
measure of the extent to which income in a society is evenly distributed. The Cen-
tral Intelligence Agency (CIA), for example, has estimated that worldwide, Gini
coefficients on family income range from over 60% for countries such as Lesotho,
South Africa, and Haiti, where income distribution is highly unequal, to under
30% for countries such as Germany, Norway, and Sweden, where income is more
equally distributed.148 In case you are curious, the CIA estimates the Gini coeffi-
cient for the United States as 45%, falling above Iran at 44.5% and below Saudi
Arabia at 45.9%.149 For our purposes, we can use the Gini coefficient as a measure
of the extent to which demand and hence copyright's incentives are evenly dis-
tributed among available works of authorship.
As it turns out, the Gini coefficient for the distribution of videogame players
in Figure 5 is nearly identical to the Gini coefficient for our hypothetical L-shaped
distribution of demand. An L-shaped distribution would generate a Gini coeffi-
cient of 1. The alternative assumption of a linear decline in demand from most
popular to least popular game would generate a Gini coefficient of 0.5. The Gini
coefficient for the actual distribution in Figure 5 is 0.9925."0
147. His original paper was published in Italian. CORRADO GINI, VARIABILITA E MUTABILITA
(1912). For an English-language version, see Corrado Gini, Measurement of Inequality of Incomes,
31 EcON.J. 124 (1921).
148. The World Factbook, CIA, https://perma.cc/6DQ3-D7CX(archivedJan. 2,2019).
149. Id.
150. By way of contrast, Kretschmer and his coauthors conducted a survey of earnings
from copyright royalties among UK authors and calculated a Gini coefficient for the earnings
of 0.74 in 2006 and 0.8 in 2018. MARTIN KRETSCHMER ET AL., UK AUTHORS' EARNINGS AND
CONTRACTS 2018: A SURVEY OF 50,000 WRITERS 20 (2019).
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A second basis of comparison is to determine the fraction of copyright's in-
centives, proxied by demand or player count, that flow to the top 1% or 10% of
the works. Calculating this for an assumed L-shaped distribution is easy. 100% of
the demand and hence all of copyright's incentives flow to the top 1% or the top
10% of the works. Indeed, in the hypothetical extreme of a true L curve, they flow
entirely to one work. In contrast, if we assume a linear decline in demand from
most popular to least popular, copyright's incentives are much more evenly dis-
tributed. With such a distribution in demand, the top 1% of the works garner 2.1%,
and the top 10% of the works garner 19% of the demand.5
Once again, for this second measure, the percentage of total player count for
the superstars in the top 10% of the Steam videogames in Figure 5 comes much
closer to the L-shaped distribution percentage than it does to the straight-line
demand percentage. For the games in Figure 5, the top 1% of the games capture
49.7% of the players. The top 10% of the games capture 89.28% of the players.
Even for the top 10% of the games, that's not 100% as it would be for an L-shaped
distribution. But it is close. The top 10% of the copyrighted videogames capture
nearly 90% of the players. If incentives are a consistent function of the number of
players who have played a game, then nearly 90% of copyright's incentives flow
to the top 10% of the works.15 2
A third basis for comparison, and the one most directly relevant for evaluat-
ing the normative merits of copyright, looks at the demand for the most popular
work divided by the demand for the median work. As discussed, from an effi-
ciency perspective, the key trade-off in optimizing copyright is between the wel-
fare losses from excess incentives and the welfare gains from marginal incentives.
On their own, both excess and marginal incentives are simply wealth transfers,
with no welfare significance. Yet, both can serve as rough proxies for the associ-
ated welfare consequences.5 3 If one dollar in additional incentives for a work at
the margins attracts one dollar in additional investment to create that work, and
that one dollar in additional investment yields a social rate of return of 100%, then
the one dollar in marginal incentives would generate a social welfare gain of one
dollar. Thus, one dollar in additional marginal incentives would equal a one dollar
gain in social welfare.15 4 Similarly, if one dollar in additional excess incentives
151. This is somewhat different from the number we calculated in Figure 2, but recall that
the data in Figure 2 included four million songs in the distribution that had never been played.
In contrast, now we are assuming that the game count ends with the last work with at least one
player.
152. By way of contrast, Kretschmer and his coauthors found that 70% of earnings among
UK authors flowed to the top 10%. KRETSCHMERETAL., supra note 151, at 20.
153. Ideally, we could determine those welfare losses and gains directly for every possible
copyright regime. We could then adopt the copyright regime that generates the maximum net
welfare gain. Unfortunately, we are not yet able to implement such an approach.
154. Not all incentives generate the same social rate of return. In the absence of unrealistic
assumptions, only those incentives that go directly to works at the margins yield a positive so-
cial rate of return. Non-marginal or excess incentives likely yield nothing or have a negative
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leads to thirty cents in deadweight welfare losses, converts forty cents of rents
into costs through socially wasteful rent-seeking, and reduces the output of our
top superstar artists and authors by thirty cents, then one dollar in additional ex-
cess incentives would generate exactly one dollar in welfare losses.' As a result,
if expanding copyright to generate one dollar in marginal incentives would also
generate one dollar in excess incentives, under these assumptions, such an expan-
sion would neither increase nor decrease social welfare. The welfare gains from
the one dollar in additional marginal incentives would exactly equal the welfare
losses from the one dollar in additional excess incentives. If these assumptions are
right, then an excess-to-marginal incentive (or EMI) ratio of one would suggest
that we are close to optimal in the amount of copyright protection we provide.
Of course, the EMI ratio that precisely defines whether we have too little, too
much, or just the right amount of copyright will depend upon how effective a
proxy the incentives, whether marginal or excess, are for the respective social
welfare gains or losses. Existing studies of social rates of return in different tech-
nological fields have found average social rates of return on patentable innova-
tions from 13% to 134%.156 If the findings of these studies can be applied to works
of authorship, then using the additional incentives copyright provides directly to
marginal works as a one-for-one proxy for welfare gains is generous, but not en-
tirely implausible. Similarly, existing studies of deadweight and rent-seeking wel-
fare losses associated with monopoly rents in other industries have found that
these welfare losses may equal all or a substantial fraction of the rents potentially
available."' In addition, in my study of the music industry from 1962 to 2015, I
showed that as revenue rose sharply during the 1990s, creative output fell sharply
from our most talented superstar tists. I further showed that this loss in super-
star output outweighed any increase in output at the margins, whether from a
social rate of return. In the recording industry, for example, overcompensating superstar au-
thors and artists did not create a lottery effect that encouraged additional works at the margins.
Rather, it reduced both the superstars' creative output and the output of hit songs by the re-
cording industry as a whole. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5, at 137, 158-69.
155. It may seem implausible for a backward-bending labor supply curve to arise with a
corporate-authored work such as a videogame. But the Duke Nukem saga provides at least one
real world example. See, e.g., Clive Thompson, Learn to Let Go: How Success Killed Duke Nukem,
WIRED (Dec. 21, 2009), https://perma.cc/EQ8F-ZB43.
156. See, e.g., Jeffrey I. Bernstein & M. Ishaq Nadiri, Interindustry R&D Spillovers, Rates of
Return, and Production in High-Tech Industries, 78 Am. EcON. REv. 429 (1988) (estimating average
social rates of return for innovations in five industries for three years, 1961, 1971, and 1981,
and finding social rates of return for: (i) chemical products 26%; (ii) nonelectrical machinery
54%; (iii) electrical products 24%; (iv) transportation equipment 13%; and (v) scientific instru-
ments 134%).
157. See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Rents, 5 WESTERN
EcoN.J. 224,231-32 (1967) (showing that the deadweight welfare losses alone substantially un-
derstate the welfare losses associated with rents); Richard A. Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly
and Regulation, 83J. POL. ECON. 807,817 (1975) ("[It is readily calculable that the total social cost
of the airline monopoly is equal to 92 percent of the total revenue of the industry at the mo-
nopoly price.').
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lottery effect or from direct additional incentives provided to works at the mar-
gins.58 As a result, as revenue rose, the number of hit songs good enough to make
the Billboard Hot 100 fell. Similarly, data released for 2014 worldwide streams
on Spotify show that the music from the 1990s remains disproportionately un-
popular on the streaming service. Given these studies, using excess incentives as
a direct one-for-one proxy for welfare losses likely underestimates the associated
welfare losses, but is again plausible, just as it was for marginal incentives.
Although not a perfect measure, if we allow for some error on either side, this
suggests a rough relationship between the EMI ratio and the socially optimal level
of copyright protection from a welfare perspective. Table 1 illustrates.
TABLE 1.USING EMI RATIOS TO DEFINE OPTIMAL COPYRIGHT
EMI Ratio Level of Copyright
<0.5 Too little
0.5 to 2 Near optimal
>2 Too much
Unfortunately, we do not have the information we need to calculate the EMI
ratio itself. For every possible copyright regime, we would need to know which
works were just expected to cover their costs and were thus marginal works, and
which works were earning a profit and were thus non-marginal. In other words,
we would need profit per unit cost for every work under every possible copyright
regime. Even for the actual copyright regime we currently have, this data is not
available and may not exist. In the real world, profits or rents may be hidden to
avoid taxation, to avoid profit sharing with a contractual partner, or accounted
for as costs when transferred to a contractual partner.15 9 Costs may also be in-
flated by socially wasteful rent seeking.160 Calculating the EMI ratio for the exist-
ing copyright regime, let alone all possible copyright regimes, may therefore be
beyond our ability at this time.
Nevertheless, under certain assumptions,161 we can use the peak-to-median
revenue or demand ratio as a rough proxy for the excess and marginal incentives
158. See LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, supra note 5, at 3-4, 154-56.
159. For some of the tricks that Hollywood uses to ensure that even high revenue films do
not generate a profit, see the sources cited in notes 215-222 below.
160. See supra text accompanying notes 42-45.
161. We can use the peak-to-median demand ratio for the existing copyright regime as a
proxy for the excess-to-marginal incentive ratio if the most popular game is non-marginal and
the median game is the marginal work, or if the we assume that the median work (in terms of
popularity) is the marginal work, and all works more popular than the median work are non-
marginal. For this to be the case, we need: (i) revenue to be correlated with demand, so that a
more popular game earns more than a less popular game; (ii) for each game to have a constant
cost, and thus higher demand games are more profitable per unit cost; and (iii) expected demand
cannot be completely uncertain ex ante. Under these assumptions, the more popular games are
more profitable under any given degree of copyright protection, and so are the videogames
producers will invest in first, with the least copyright protection.
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copyright likely provides, and thus as a rough measure of copyright's likely effi-
ciency. Specifically, if costs for producing any work of authorship are constant,1 6 2
regardless of the work's popularity, then revenue or demand becomes a reasona-
ble proxy for profit. The more popular a work is, the more likely it is profitable.
The more popular a work is, the more likely that is non-marginal. Comparing the
demand for the most popular videogame to the demand for the median video
game can thus provide a rough estimate of the "quick-look" EMI ratio. To be ac-
curate in evaluating whether any given marginal expansion in copyright is desir-
able, we would have to compare the marginal social value of the one marginal
work that an incremental copyright expansion generates not just to the marginal
excess incentive costs associated with the most popular work, but to those costs
associated with all of the non-marginal works to which the expansion applies.
Again, we can approximate this "more accurate" EMI ratio by assuming that all
works more popular than the median work are non-marginal, and then compare
the total demand, whether streams or player count, for those non-marginal works
to the demand for the median work. While this "more accurate" ratio is the correct
one to use, for many copyright industries, we may have data only for the most
popular and average work and may therefore have to rely on the "quick-look"
ratio.
When we calculate the peak-to-median demand ratio for Figure 5, and use it
as a proxy for the EMI ratio,1 63 we find an EMI orders of magnitude higher than
two-the outer boundary of welfare-enhancing copyright. For Figure 5, the most
popular game had 50,191,347 estimated players. The mean player count was
133,951.5 players, and the estimated player count for the median game was
4,163.164 Thus, if we expand copyright to increase the earnings of the median
162. This is plausible for the creation of some works of authorship, such as sound record-
ings. It is less plausible for PC videogames.
163. As discussed, see supra note 161, for this relationship to hold, we must assume that:
(i) revenue is correlated with demand, so that a more popular game earns more than a less pop-
ular game; (ii) for each game to have a constant cost, and thus higher demand games are more
profitable per unit cost; and (iii) expected demand cannot be completely uncertain ex ante. We
can have more confidence that the peak-to-median revenue or demand ratio serves as an effec-
tive proxy for the EMI ratio for something like sound recordings that have a relatively constant
cost structure to create and distribute regardless of how popular or unpopular the sound re-
cording at issue proves to be. Yet, even if the peak-to-median demand or revenue ratio is not a
perfect proxy for the EMI ratio, it is likely the best estimate we can get. As mentioned, in theory,
profit per unit cost would provide a better guide to which works are marginal and which non-
marginal. However, real world cost figures are not available and are skewed in any event by:
(i) the desire to limit taxable income; (ii) the desire to limit profit-sharing with partners; (iii) the
practice of accounting as costs rent-transfers to contractual partners; and (iv) socially wasteful,
rent-seeking expenditures. Thus, using the PMR revenue ratio is probably the best approxima-
tion for the EMI ratio we have.
164. For the data in Figure 5, the mean-to-median ratio is 32.177. The mean is sharply
higher than the median because the distribution of demand is sharply skewed in favor of the
most popular games.
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gamel6 5 by $1, and earnings increase proportionally to player count, then that
same expansion would also increase the earnings of the most popular game by
$12,056.53. If we assume that the most popular game would have been profitable
with less or no copyright protection and is thus non-marginal, then these
$12,056.53 in additional earnings represent excess incentives. As a result, the
"quick-look" EMI ratio for the most popular-to-median game ratio for Figure 5
is 12,056.53. If we extend the analysis to be more accurate, assume that all games
more popular than the median game are non-marginal, and so include the player
count for all of the games more popular than the median game, then to increase
the earnings associated with the median game by 31, copyright must also increase
the earnings of the more popular games by $425,730.08. Thus, the "more accu-
rate" EMI ratio for Figure 5, which compares the total player count for all of the
more-popular-than-median games to the player count for the median game, is
425,730.08.
Whether we use the quick-look or more-accurate EMI ratio, on this third
measure, the EMI ratio for the videogame player distribution in Figure 5 is closer
to the EMI ratio for the straight-line distribution of demand model than for the
hypothetical L-shaped distribution of demand. Proponents of broader copyright
hoping to take comfort from that fact will find little solace, however. The quick-
look EMI ratio for the linear model is two. Assuming that demand declines in a
straight line establishes mathematically that the demand for the most popular
work is exactly twice the demand for the median work. The more-accurate EMI
ratio, which looks at how the one dollar in additional incentives for the median
work increases the excess incentives for all of the non-marginal works more pop-
ular than the median work, depends on the number of works produced.1 6 6 For the
13,281 games for which we have data on Steam, the more accurate EMI ratio,
165. I use the median player estimate, rather than the mean, because the mean is itself in-
flated by the popularity of the most popular games. In my book, COPYRIGHT's EXCESS, I used the
mean in calculating this ratio at several points because I did not have access to the median,
either for Spotify streams or album sales.
166. In a straight-line declining distribution of demand model, the more accurate EMI ra-
tio is 0.75 times the number of works produced. Thus, for a market where ten total games were
produced, the more accurate EMI ratio would be 7.5. For a market where ten thousand total
games were produced, the more accurate EMI ratio would be 7,500. We can derive this as the
difference in the area under two straight-lines, one starting at the y-axis at P1 and the other
starting at a higher level, P2, where the difference between P1 and P2 reflects an increase in
revenue for the most popular work as a result of increased copyright protection. We rank order
the works from most to least popular, and the revenue for each falls linearly until both lines hit
zero at the least popular work, work X. In this scenario, the work, m, is the median work. Be-
cause it is the median work, m = 0.5X. It earns revenue 0.5P1 with copyright regime 1 and 0.5P2
in slightly broader copyright regime 2. In addition to generating additional revenue for the
median work, moving from copyright regime 1 to copyright regime 2 generates excess incen-
tives for those works more popular than the median work of: 0.75'm(P2-P1). The median
work earns additional revenue from the increase in copyright protection of: 0.5(P2-P1). Di-
viding the excess incentives by the additional revenue for the median work, and substituting
for m = 0.5X, the more accurate EMI ratio with the straight-line declining distribution becomes:
EMI = 0.75X, where X is the total number of works produced in the relevant industry.
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assuming straight-line distribution of demand, would be 9,960.75. In contrast, for
the hypothetical L-shaped distribution of demand, the EMI ratio, whether quick-
look or more-accurate, is infinity. In the L-shaped distribution, the median work
receives no demand at all. However high the demand for the most popular game
in copyright's tall peak, that demand is still finite. As a result, when we divide that
peak by zero, the ratio becomes infinity. Compared to infinity, either the quick-
look or more-accurate EMI ratio for Figure 5 is, in a precise mathematical sense,
nothing at all. 16 7 So in that sense, the ratios for Figure 5 and the linear demand
model, because they are both finite numbers, are closer.
However, in the real world of copyright's benefits and costs, even the lower
estimate of $12,056.33 in proxied welfare losses for the actual distribution of de-
mand, is nowhere close to $2 in proxied welfare losses for the linear demand
model. For an EMI ratio of two, it is at least possible that $1 in additional incen-
tives for works at the margins of profitability might generate marginal social
value in excess of the welfare losses associated with $2 in additional excess incen-
tives. If, for example, we take the peak average social return of 134% found for
patentable inventions, assume that it applies to copyrighted works, and also as-
sume that 31 in additional marginal incentives attracts 31 in investment towards
additional creative works, then that $1 in additional marginal incentives would
generate $1.34 in marginal social value. If we assume that any additional excess
incentives generate welfare losses at only fifty cents on the dollar,1 68 then the $2
in additional excess incentives would generate welfare losses of only $1. Under
these generous but not implausible assumptions, we might be able to justify cop-
yright with an EMI ratio of two. 1 6 9
On the other hand, even assuming a very generous social rate of return on
the additional marginal incentives and a very low estimate of welfare losses from
additional excess incentives, it is essentially impossible to justify copyright at a
quick-look EMI ratio of 12,056. Under any reasonable assumptions regarding
how these two incentives convert into welfare losses and gains, the welfare losses
associated with the additional excess incentives will exceed the welfare gains from
the additional marginal incentives. For example, let us assume that the $1 in ad-
ditional incentives for works at the margins yields a social rate of return of 1000%,
and that 31 in additional excess incentives leads to welfare losses of one cent. Even
with these absurdly generous assumptions towards the case for copyright, the
welfare losses associated with the $12,056.33 in additional excess incentives
would still be 3120.56. The welfare gain on the other hand would be only 310. In
167. Any finite number divided by infinity is zero.
168. I have suggested that 50 cents on the dollar might be an appropriate conversion factor
for estimating the welfare losses from excess incentives elsewhere. See Lunney, The Death of
Copyright, supra note 35, at 866 n.181; Lunney, Copyrights Incentives-Access Paradigm, supra note
21, at 557 n.283.
169. Of course, even for a straight-line declining distribution, for a market with 13,281
games, the more-accurate EMI is 9,960.75. That suggests that the welfare losses from copyright
for such a market exceed any welfare gains from additional works at the margins.
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other words, for the distribution of demand Figure 5 depicts, which has a quick-
look EMI ratio of 12,056, the welfare losses from the excess incentives would
likely exceed the welfare gain from the marginal incentives by an order of mag-
nitude. And that's both for our lower quick-look EMI ratio, rather than our higher
more-accurate EMI ratio, and with absurdly generous, pro-copyright assump-
tions for converting the additional marginal incentives and the additional excess
incentives into welfare gains and losses, respectively.
As a result, while the EMI ratios for the Figure 5 distribution are, in a math-
ematical sense, closer to the EMI ratios for the straight-line distribution than they
are to the ratio for the L-shaped distribution, that mathematical closeness is
simply because the first two sets of EMI ratios are both finite numbers. While they
are therefore closer to each other than either is to infinity, in the real world of
copyright policy, the two sets of EMI ratios are not close at all.
The actual distribution of demand for the videogames on Steam's platform
with developer-designed achievements is not a perfect L curve. It does, however,
come quite close. In the next Part, I will further explore the normative implica-
tions of this fact. I will also examine how we might change, amend, or interpret
aspects of copyright law so that it can rationally serve its constitutional purpose
if this data from the videogame sector accurately reflects the distribution of de-
mand for copyrighted works generally.
IV. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND A CALL FOR ACTION
A. If the Demand Distribution Is L-Shaped or Nearly So, Can We Justify
Copyright?
If the question is whether we can justify copyright in the face of an L-shaped
distribution of demand, the answer is simple: No. If the distribution of demand is
L-shaped, we cannot justify copyright.
From an efficiency perspective, in the face of an L-shaped distribution of de-
mand, copyright becomes inefficient. With an L-shaped distribution, essentially
all of copyright's incentives flow to non-marginal works. None, or essentially
none, flows to marginal works. The incentives copyright provides are all excess;
none are marginal. As a result, the welfare losses associated with the excess incen-
tives copyright provides will vastly outweigh any potential welfare gains from
whatever additional incentives copyright may provide for works at the margins
of profitability.
While the actual distribution of demand in Figure 5 does not precisely the
match the hypothetical extreme of the L curve, at almost every point along the
distribution, enacting or expanding copyright will likely generate additional ex-
cess incentives and associated welfare losses that far exceed the welfare gains as-
sociated with the additional incentives for works at the margins. To illustrate, let
us assume that some of the PC videogames in Figure 5 would be produced with-
out any copyright at all. History, economics, and common sense all tell us that this
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is virtually certain, even if we limit our focus to profit-motivated production.o
Even so, we do not know which or how many videogames would be produced
with less or no copyright. As discussed, the information does not exist to enable
us to separate marginal and non-marginal games for every possible copyright re-
gime. Nevertheless, if the most popular games are also the most profitable for any
given level of copyright protection,"' then those are the games that will become
profitable and hence be produced first, as we move from a legal regime with no
copyright protection to legal regimes with increasing degrees of copyright pro-
tection.1 7 2 Putting intrinsically motivated authorship to one side, these popular
games may be produced because lead-time advantages, reputational rents, or
other market forces enable the producer to cover the costs of such games even
without copyright.173 Or they may be produced because Marshall's superstar
model applies, and we see overinvestment in and overproduction of such games,
relative to the social ideal. But whatever the reason some profit-motivated pro-
duction will occur even without copyright, and under our assumptions, the most
popular videogames will be produced first. Let us further assume that we are con-
sidering a move from a legal regime with no copyright protection to a legal regime
with the first, smallest possible increment of copyright protection.1 74 If adopted,
this first increment will ensure the expected profitability and hence production
of just one more videogame. Given our assumptions, that one more videogame
will be the next most popular. At the same time that adopting copyright increases
170. See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
171. Certainly, we know that some of the most popular games are extremely profitable.
Although not available on Steam, the maker of one of the most popular current games, Fortnite,
for example, earned $3 billion in profits in 2018. See Erik Klein, Fortnite Creator Epic Games
Reportedly Earned $3 Billion in Profits in 2018, FORBES (Dec. 27, 2018), https://perma.cc/96UL-
8FSJ.
172. This assumption allows us to use the peak-to-median demand ratio as a proxy for the
excess-to-marginal incentive ratio. The assumption may well be wrong. But the choice is to
make the assumption and have a plausibly accurate proxy for the welfare balance or not have a
measure at all. The welfare balance and costs associated with excess incentives are real in either
event.
173. See supra text accompanying notes 30-37.
174. In the model, we adopt the smallest possible increment of copyright. We define that
increment as one that would render just one more work at the margins profitable. Such an
increment might provide only one more hour or one more day of copyright protection. While
that is fine for a model, it is unrealistic to expect Congress to debate and enact such a trivial
change in the protection regime. In the real world, the smallest politically viable increment of
copyright protection might resemble the copyright protection Congress provided in 1790 in
the first copyright act in the United States. Copyright Act of 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124. It might
include: (i) a short, fourteen-year term; (ii) a narrow scope of protection again only exact, me-
chanical duplication by competing commercial publishers; and (iii) a limited set of remedies.
This does not affect the calculations in the model, however. Adopting such a discrete, politically
feasible increment would increase the revenue and hence ensure the profitability of not just
one additional works at the margins, but many. Nonetheless, for any given increment of copy-
right, there will always be one marginal work, exactly at the border of profitability. For the rest
of the additional works, there would be some element of excess incentives, for which we would
need to account.
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the revenue and thus ensures the xistence of this marginal work, adopting cop-
yright increase the revenue of the more popular, and by assumption, non-mar-
ginal, games proportionally. It will also therefore create additional excess incen-
tives.
Even with these assumptions, we still do not know how many videogames
will be produced without copyright. We can nevertheless illustrate various possi-
bilities by assuming that: (i) only the most popular game will be produced without
copyright; (ii) only the top two most popular games will be produced without cop-
yright; (iii) only the top ten most popular games will be produced without copy-
right; and (iv) only the top 1% of games will be produced without copyright. For
each of these possibilities, we can treat the 2nd, the 3rd, the 11th, or the 133rd
most-popular game as the marginal game and calculate quick-look and more-ac-
curate demand ratios accordingly. Table 2 presents the results.
TABLE 2. QUICK-LOOK AND MORE-ACCURATE DEMAND RATIOS FOR THE ACTUAL
DISTRIBUTION OF DEMAND, ASSUMING THAT THE 2ND, 3RD, 11TH, OR 133RD
MOST POPULAR GAME IS THE MARGINAL WORK AND ALL MORE POPULAR GAMES
ARE NON-MARGINAL





If we take these demand ratios as a rough proxy for our quick-look and more-
accurate EMI ratios, they suggest why copyright is essentially impossible to justify
under the actual distribution of demand in Figure 5 from an efficiency or social
welfare perspective. Obviously, if no works would be created and distributed in
the absence of copyright, adopting some minimal degree of copyright protection
is welfare enhancing. In such a case, there are no non-marginal works. No non-
marginal works, no excess incentives. No excess incentives, no welfare losses. But
history, economics, and common sense all suggest that even without copyright,
we will likely see a substantial degree of profit-motivated authorial production in
the market.
Once we have essentially any works created and istributed in the absence of
copyright, the welfare losses associated with the additional excess incentives that
175. Recall that the "quick-look" ratio compares the player count for the most popular
game, which we have assumed to be non-marginal, to the player count for the marginal work.
176. Recall that the "more-accurate" ratio compares the total player count for the non-
marginal works, which we have assumed to be those games more popular than the marginal
work, to the player count for the marginal work.
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even the narrowest possible copyright regime would provide will likely exceed
the welfare gains from the additional incentives and associated creative output at
the margins."' Perhaps, it might be possible to justify the initial adoption of some
minimal degree of copyright protection if only one game would be produced
without copyright. But even then, the copyright adopted would need to be ex-
tremely short, narrow, and ineffective at controlling unauthorized copying-suf-
ficient to ensure the expected profitability and hence production of just one more
game. As soon as two games are produced without copyright or with extremely
narrow copyright, the welfare losses associated with the excess incentives for
these two games likely outweigh the welfare gains from enacting or expanding
copyright to ensure the expected profitability of the third game. As Table 2 re-
flects, if the two most popular videogames are produced without copyright, then
to generate just one dollar in incentives for the marginal work, the third most
popular videogame, copyright would also generate $2.64 in additional excess in-
centives. As discussed, we can plausibly assume that marginal and excess incen-
tives serve as dollar-for-dollar proxies for the associated welfare gains or losses."
As a dollar-for-dollar proxy, the welfare losses from $2.64 in additional excess
incentives would likely exceed the welfare gain from $1 in additional marginal
incentives. As a result, if the market would produce just wo videogames in the
absence of copyright protection, then enacting any form of copyright is undesir-
able and inefficient. It would reduce social welfare. Only if the market would pro-
duce essentially no works in the absence of copyright can we justify copyright,
and even then we can justify only the shortest, narrowest, and least effective cop-
yright regime imaginable.
As for the other two justifications for copyright, copyright is not a welfare
system. 9 Even if we wanted it to be, Figure 5 illustrates two reasons why copy-
right would not prove effective as a welfare system. First, under today's copyright,
again assuming that Figure 5's demand distribution is typical, nearly 90% of the
incentives that copyright provides go to the top 10% of the works. The remaining
90% of works receive only slightly more than 10% of the incentives that copyright
generates. That means that in order to provide very small sums to the median
177. The skewed distribution of demand leads the additional excess incentives and associ-
ated welfare losses to rise extremely quickly. Even without the skew, the math of the excess-to-
marginal incentive balance establishes that only a very narrow, extremely short, and relatively
ineffective copyright regime can plausibly be welfare-enhancing. For example, if we switch to
profit-per-unit cost and make the assumption most generous to copyright, that the demand
decreases only infinitesimally from the first to the second to the third and so on most popular
works, the more-accurate EMI would be one if only work is produced without copyright, two
if two works are produced without copyright, three if only three works are produced without
copyright, and so on. Again, as long as any significant, non-intrinsically-motivated authorship
occurs in the absence of copyright, today's long, broad, and relatively effective copyright cannot
be justified. Even under a step function distribution of demand where every work is equally
demanded-the distribution most favorable to copyright-copyright is a losing proposition if
the market is able to produce just the first two or three works without copyright.
178. See supra text accompanying notes 154-161.
179. Thanks to Pam Samuelson for expressing the point in this way.
Winter 2020 53
STANFORD TECHNOLOGY LAW REVIEW
artist or author, copyright must also provide vast sums to our most popular su-
perstars. In recent work using data from Spotify, I estimated that to provide $1 to
the copyright owners of the "average" song, copyright would also have to provide
$66,666 to the copyright owners of the song that was, at the time, most popular,
One Dance.1so For this calculation, I used a mean Spotify stream count of roughly
15,000 streams per year as the demand for the "average" work because I did not
have the stream count for the median work."' Use of the mean is inappropriate
in this context, however, because the mean is skewed sharply upwards by the ex-
tremely high demand for the most popular works. For the videogames in Figure
5, for example, the mean player count was 133,951.5. The median player count,
on the other hand, was only 4,163. If we want to know how much help copyright
provides the average artist, we should use the stream count for the median work.
While we do not have a stream count for the median work on Spotify, we can get
an estimate by assuming the distribution of demand on Spotify is as skewed as the
distribution of demand for videogames in Figure 5.182 If we do, then my initial
calculation vastly overstates how much copyright can do for the average artist. If
the median-to-mean ratio for streams on Spotify is the same as for the video-
games shown in Figure 5,' then the "average" song on Spotify, defined as the
song at the 50th percentile of popularity, receives not 15,000 streams a year, but
only 466 streams a year. As a result, to put 31 for a loaf of bread in the hands of
the copyright owner of such a median song, copyright has to give the copyright
owner of the most popular song on Spotify, Shape of You, $4.29 million-the price
of a fully furnished and nicely stocked vacation home.18 4 Because of the skewed
demand, and at least so long as copyright is uniform, there is simply no way cop-
yright can ensure the median artist or author a livable wage without vastly over-
paying our most popular superstars. If a livable wage is our goal for the average
artist, then copyright, at least as presently imagined, is not a viable mechanism for
achieving it.
Perhaps, however, we are prepared to live with this math and are willing to
enrich vastly our superstars and ignore the associated eadweight and other wel-
fare losses associated with overpaying our superstars if that is what it takes to
provide the median artist or author a livable wage. Yet, that will not in the end
promote distributive justice for the second reason. The Gini coefficient associated
180. See Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 21.
18 1. Id.
182. As discussed, demand decays more rapidly, on a percentile of total works basis, for
the Spotify top 100 songs than it does for the Steam top 100 games. See supra text accompanying
notes 143-146. This suggests that the demand for music on Spotify is even more skewed and
even more L-shaped than it is for the videogames in Figure 5.
183. For Figure 5, the mean-to-median ratio is 32.177.
184. The $4.29 million number comes from dividing the number of times the most popular
song on Spotify, Shape of You, was streamed, at over 2 billion, by the number of streams for the
median song, at 466 streams. For the price of a vacation home, see, e.g., The Most Expensive Va-
cation Homes in America, TRULIA BLOG, https://perma.cc/XDD7-3XMT (archived Dec. 25, 2019)
(listing eight homes ranging in price from $3.57 million to $145 million).
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with the demand for videogames in Figure 5, at 99.25%, represents almost perfect
inequality. It is also far higher than the Gini coefficient for family income in the
United States generally, at 45%. Because of this disparity, the more national in-
come that is redistributed through the copyright system the less equal our na-
tional income distribution will become, at least if Figure 5's demand distribution
is typical for copyrighted works generally. Indeed, as more of our national income
is redistributed through the copyright system,185 the closer our distribution of in-
come, and our associated Gini coefficient, will come to the near-perfect inequality
of Figure 5. For this reason, attempting to use copyright to achieve distributive
justice would prove self-defeating. Copyright creates the very inequity in the dis-
tribution of income that distributive justice abhors.
B. Moving Forward: No Legislation Without Information
In the light of our inability to justify copyright in the light of the skewed dis-
tribution of demand shown in Figure 5, the question becomes: How do we move
forward from here? The first step is obvious. We need to determine whether:
(i) Figure 5 is idiosyncratic and reflects the distribution of demand only for PC
videogames; or (ii) Figure 5 is representative of the distribution of demand for a
broad range of copyrighted works. Copyright owners, copyright collectives, and
copyright intermediaries have this information. We need it. As a result, when
these entities come to our government, whether that be Congress, an administra-
tive agency, or a court, and ask for assistance in enacting, expanding, or enforcing
copyright, our government needs to insist that these entities provide the infor-
mation that we need. With respect to pleas for amendments to the Copyright Act,
we should adopt a simple rule: No legislation without this information.
In the meantime, until we have this information, the only prudent approach
is to assume that the distribution of demand that Figure 5 shows for PC video-
games is representative of the distribution of demand for all works of authorship
for two reasons. First, we know that Figure 5 represents the real-world distribu-
tion of demand for PC videogames. We know that many other works of author-
ship share the same popularity and network effects that seem to drive the skewed
demand in Figure 5.186 We also know that superstar artists and authors, whose
works sharply outsell the average artist or author, are a commonplace feature of
markets for copyrighted works generally.'8 ' Thus, it seems quite likely, even if we
do not have the data to prove it, that the markets for other works of authorship
185. Again, assuming the distribution of copyright income reflects the distribution of de-
mand. I would also note that for corporate-authored works, such as videogames, the income
from a popular videogame may be redistributed to employees of the corporate author in a way
that ameliorates, at least to some extent, the unequal distribution of demand in the marketplace.
186. See Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 883-87.
187. See id. at 884 (noting that the top 10% of the films released in 1999 and 2000 captured
48.2 and 43.9%, respectively, of the total domestic box office receipts in those years).
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share, at least to some degree, the same skewed distribution of demand as PC vid-
eogames. Second, presuming that Figure 5 is representative and that the distribu-
tion of demand in most copyright markets is an L curve places the burden on the
parties with the actual data to prove otherwise.' If the market for some other
type of copyrighted work does not share the highly skewed demand we see for
PC videogames in Figure 5, all copyright owners, copyright collectives, or copy-
right intermediaries have to do is show us.
Until they do, we should assume that Figure 5 is representative of the distri-
bution of demand for works of authorship generally. With that first step taken, at
least until further information becomes available, the next steps require Congress
and the courts to amend or interpret copyright law in ways that reduce excess
incentives while maintaining incentives for works at the margins of profitability.
To those next steps I now turn.
C. A Callfor Cost-Based Copyright
As a regulatory intervention, the purpose of copyright is to help ensure that
authors and artists have a reasonable opportunity to recoup their persuasion costs
to create and distribute socially valuable works of authorship. Vastly enriching
superstar artists and authors was never the purpose of copyright. It was an acci-
dent of poor regulatory design. The resulting excess incentives are costly, both
directly and indirectly.
Directly, excess incentives create the same welfare losses as monopoly rents
generally: (i) deadweight welfare losses; and (ii) socially wasteful rent-seeking ex-
penditures. In this context, however, excess incentives impose a further welfare
loss. As I have shown happened in the recording industry when revenues peaked
in the 1990s, vastly overpaying our superstars reduced their creative output.189 As
we paid them more for each hit song, they produced fewer hit songs.190 Overbroad
copyright thus interferes with the very goal copyright is meant to serve. Consider
an example that plainly illustrates the cultural cost of copyright. The Beatles re-
leased their first album in 1963-a low revenue era for the recording industry.
During the early 1960s, the best-selling artists released, on average, fourteen stu-
dio albums in their first ten years.191 The Beatles came close to matching that av-
erage. They released twelve studio albums and an EP in ten years and then broke
up. 19 2 As revenues for the industry rose, however, the output of our best-selling
188. Adopting such a presumption has longstanding roots in the Anglo-American legal
system. See Armory v. Delamirie (1722) 93 Eng. Rep. 664 ("[T]he ChiefJustice directed the jury,
that unless the defendant did produce the jewel, and shew it not to be of the finest water, they
should presume the strongest against him, and make the value of the best jewels the measure of
their damages: which they accordingly did.").
189. See Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 157-92.
190. Id. at 157-69.
191. Id. at 169-70.
192. Id. at 170.
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artists fell. By the time we reach the high-revenue 1990s, our best-selling artists
released, on average, fewer than five albums in their first ten years.193 Imagine the
loss to our cultural legacy if the Beatles had released their first album in 1993 and
had matched the average output of the top recording artists in the peak revenue
1990s. In that case, the Beatles would have produced only four or five studio al-
bums before breaking up. As a society, we would have lost Sergeant Pepper's Lonely
Hearts Club Band, The White Album, and Abbey Road.19 4
Indirectly, these excess incentives also limit our ability to provide adequate
protection for the truly marginal work. So long as copyright is uniform, the cost
of excess incentives limits our ability to extend more extensive protection to the
socially valuable work at the margins of profitability.195 Because of the welfare
balance, as excess incentives rise, we must limit the scope of copyright protection.
We may therefore be unable to provide the protection that a truly marginal work
needs to achieve expected profitability. Excess incentives thus limit the ability of
copyright, as a regulatory intervention, to achieve its stated purpose.
We need therefore to change how we think about copyright. In doing so, we
need to put aside labels and stories that will lead us astray. It is not helpful and is
affirmatively misleading to speak of copyright as property, whether intellectual
or otherwise, or as a natural or human right. For many, these labels serve as heu-
ristic shortcuts that suggest a nature, strength, and intrinsic desirability of the
right to control copying fundamentally inconsistent with designing a copyright
regime that rationally advances its constitutional objective. To design a rational
copyright, it is best to think of, and label, copyright as a mere regulatory interven-
tion whose purpose is to provide society with a wide and varied supply of original
works of authorship. As a regulatory intervention, copyright best serves its con-
stitutional objective when it seeks to provide a copyright owner with a reasonable
opportunity to recoup its persuasion costs for authoring and distributing an orig-
inal work of authorship. Nothing more. When a copyright owner has had the op-
portunity to recoup, and certainly, when the copyright owner has recouped, its
persuasion costs, the purpose of copyright has been satisfied. At that point, copy-
right protection should end.
The ideal then for which Congress, the courts, and the Copyright Office
ought to strive is cost-based copyright. A "cost-based" copyright seeks to mimic
what we see in competitive markets and would strive to achieve two goals. First,
it would seek to provide each copyright owner with a reasonable opportunity to
recoup its persuasion costs for authoring and distributing the work at issue. Sec-
ond, it would seek to eliminate, or at least, minimize excess incentives. To accom-
plish these two goals, we should re-design copyright expressly as a cost recovery
or cost recoupment mechanism. Through such an approach, we can better match
the private returns in copyright markets to the returns available in competitive
193. Id.
194. Id. at 169-75.
195. See Lunney, A Quiet Revolution, supra note 29, at 64-68 (illustrating the trade-off in the
patent context).
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markets generally. In this re-design, Congress, the courts, and the Copyright Of-
fice all have roles they can play.
While I have suggested other approaches to such a re-design elsewhere,196 in
this article, I will explore two alternative approaches. First, Congress and the
courts can and should incorporate cost recoupment into copyright directly.
Moreover, they should do so on a work-by-work basis within the existing frame-
work of broad and long copyright protection. Under this approach, to establish
infringement or obtain injunctive relief, a copyright owner would have to prove
that if the use is allowed, the copyright owner would not have expected to recoup
the work's costs at the time it invested in the work at issue. The idea is not to cut
off copyright protection as soon as any given work achieves profitability. Such an
approach would change the expected return on every work and leave copyright
owners only with expected losses. Rather, the idea is to tailor copyright protection
so that each work receives precisely that level or degree of copyright protection
necessary to generate the expectation ex ante that the work will just cover its costs
and a reasonable, risk-adjusted return on investment. If, for example, a work cost
one dollar to produce and distribute, and has a one-in-one-hundred chance of
being a success, then we should tailor copyright protection to ensure that such a
work, when it succeeds, captures revenue of one hundred dollars in the market.
If a work costs one dollar to create and distribute, and has a one-in-ten-thousand
chance of success, then we should tailor copyright to ensure such a work, when it
succeeds, captures revenue of ten thousand dollars. Rather than generally uni-
form copyright protection for all works, we should tailor copyright so that the
copyright owner precisely captures revenue sufficient to cover its persuasion cost
for the specific work at issue. Under this proposal, we would reserve the broad
and long protection copyright currently provides only for those relatively unpop-
ular works right at the margins of profitability. In contrast, for those extremely
popular works that would prove profitable even with much narrower and shorter
copyright protection, Congress or the courts would provide only that narrower
and shorter copyright protection necessary to induce their creation and distribu-
tion.
The goal of the proposal is to ensure that every valuable work has a chance
to recoup its costs, but end protection once any given work has recouped its costs
or is expected to recoup its costs despite the use at issue. Congress could imple-
ment this approach by amending the Copyright Act to require a plaintiff to prove
that protection against the defendant's use at issue is necessary at the time it oc-
curs to ensure the work's expected profitability at the time the decision to author
and distribute the work was made. Alternatively, courts could implement this ap-
proach by incorporating cost recoupment on a work-by-work basis into the
196. See Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 198-207 (proposing: (i) replacing
copyright with prize or grant system; (ii) using existing structures to reduce excess incentives
and increase marginal incentives by adopting a two-tier pricing approach for mechanical li-
censes and providing a livable wage through performing rights organizations, such as ASCAP;
and (iii) adopting a copyright windfall profit tax to reduce excess incentives).
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fourth fair use factor1 9 7 or into the fourth eBay factor for determining whether to
give injunctive relief.198
Under the fair use approach, if the defendant's use would not reduce the ex-
pected return at the time of a work's creation and distribution below a reasonable
risk-adjusted return on costs, the use, whether to create a further creative work
or even for mere duplication, would be fair. As the Court has recognized, "[tlhe
fair use doctrine . .. 'permits [and requires] courts to avoid rigid application of the
copyright statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which that
law is designed to foster."'199 Unfortunately, courts today do not interpret the
fourth fair use factor in a way that aligns copyright with its constitutional objec-
tive. They treat any loss in market value as weighing against fair use.20 0 They
should not.20 1 The only loss in actual or potential market value that should weigh
against fair use is a loss that moves a work from an ex ante expectation of profit-
ability to an ex ante expectation of unprofitability.20 2 If the loss in value moves a
work from an ex ante expectation of obscenely profitable to an ex ante expecta-
tion of only hugely profitable, that should not weigh against fair use. To the con-
trary, that there remains an expectation of huge profits should weigh conclusively
in favor of finding the use at issue fair.2 03
197. The fourth fair use factor requires a court to consider "the effect of the use upon the
potential market for or value of the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 107(4).
198. The fourth eBay factor in the equitable balancing to determine whether to grant in-
junctive relief requires a court to determine "that he public interest would not be disserved by
a permanent injunction." eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
199. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994) (quoting Stewart v.
Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990)).
200. See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,567 (1985) (finding
a loss of $12,500 from the defendant's copying to weigh against fair use).
201. As Congress noted in the legislative history accompanying the 1976 Copyright Act,
the statutory codification of the four factors was not intended to freeze the doctrine in the
statute, especially during a period of rapid technological change. H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 65
(1976). Instead, Congress left the courts to adapt the doctrine to particular situations on a case-
by-case basis. Id. at 66.
202. In Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp., the district court properly recognized that harm
to the potential value of a copyrighted work should not be decided in the abstract, but in terms
of the threat to the work's creation:
Before proceeding to a discussion of these factors, the court notes that the extent
of the harm which plaintiffs ask the court to assume is probable is unclear. Harm
which "imperils the existence of a publication" is more destructive of a fair use de-
fense than is harm which would "limit profits." Plaintiffs' experts have testified that
if Betamax is not enjoined, their profits will decrease, and that for some programs,
they may not recoup their production costs. If this happens, plaintiffs warn, they will
have to reduce the quality, or at least the production costs, of their audiovisual works.
Plaintiffs have not said that they will no longer be able to produce this material.
Universal City Studios v. Sony Corp. of Am., 480 F. Supp. 429, 452 (C.D. Cal. 1979) (citation
omitted), rev'd, 659 F.2d 963 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
203. I have advocated a similar approach in earlier work. See Glynn S. LunneyJr., Fair Use
and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L. REv. 975, 999 (2002) ("On one side of the balance,
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Consider, for example, the Harry Potter Lexicon case.20 4 In 1997, the copyright
owners published the first Harry Potter novel, Harry Potter and the Sorcerer's Stone.2 05
The copyright owners went on to publish a total of seven Harry Potter novels. The
novels became, in turn, eight theatrical movies. As the district court noted: "The
Harry Potter series has achieved enormous popularity and phenomenal sales."20 6
Yet, when a fan of the series wrote and published a lexicon that explained the
characters, creatures, and elements of the Harry Potter world, the copyright own-
ers for the books and the movies sued.20 7 Based in part upon J.K. Rowling's testi-
mony that she planned to publish such an encyclopedia herself20 8 (still waiting on
that by the way), the district court found the use unfair and enjoined the Lexicon's
publication.2 0 9
Yet, if fair use is intended to better align copyright with its constitutional
purpose, the court's decision is wrong. The relevant counterfactual asks: If we had
toldJ.K. Rowling that once her work became widely popular, and she became rich
almost beyond imagining, copyright law, through the fair use doctrine, would al-
low a fan to publish such a lexicon, would she have written and distributed her
first Harry Potter novel nonetheless? As a counterfactual, we do not have empirical
evidence on the issue. Nevertheless, I can see no reason for doubting that J.K.
Rowling would still have published the Harry Potter novels. Finding the defend-
ant's use to be unfair, as the district court did, denied the public access to an ad-
ditional creative work, the Lexicon itself, and for no reason.2 10
More generally, once a work is expected to recoup its costs from any given
level or term of copyright, providing further copyright protection to that work
can only frustrate copyright's constitutional objective. Once a work is expected
to recoup its costs, further protection for that work becomes unnecessary to en-
sure that the work will be authored and distributed. Further protection at that
attention should be directed toward the extent to which prohibiting a particular use will lead
to more and better works of authorship by asking: (1) whether the unauthorized use would
otherwise reduce the revenue associated with the copyrighted work; and (2) if so, how, if at all,
that reduction would likely affect the pro-duction of copyrighted works."). This proposal dif-
fers. In the Fair Use and Market Failure article, I was still dealing with the issue as if a fair use
finding for a specific use for one work would apply to all works. Id. at 1017. In this article, I
advocate a work-by-work cost recoupment approach to fair use and embrace the rate regula-
tion approach I there rejected. Id.
204. Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. RDR Books, 575 F. Supp. 2d 513, 575 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
205. Id. at 518.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 519-24.
208. Id. at 519.
209. Id. at 551-53.
210. The district court feared the finding fair use in this case would mean that lexicons
were fair for every book series and thus "deplete the incentive for original authors to create
new works." Id. at 553. This reasoning reflects both an unjustified fear on its face-marginal
works seldom receive fan lexicons-and a misunderstanding of fair use doctrine. Fair use need
not be one-size-fits-all. In other words, that a use if fair with respect to an extremely popular
and profitable work such as the Harry Potter books need not be fair for a marginal work.
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point can only: (i) stifle further creative work that builds on the work at issue;
(ii) limit access to the work at issue; and (iii) potentially push the copyright owner
onto the backward-bending portion of the labor supply curve and reduce poten-
tial future authorial output.
As a result, once a work is expected to recoup its persuasion costs, any further
use of the work should be fair and non-infringing.21 For similar reasons, injunc-
tive relief should be available only if necessary to ensure an ex ante expectation
of cost recoupment. Once a copyright owner has an expectation of recoupment
without an injunction against the use at issue, an injunction against the defend-
ant's use would necessarily disserve the public interest.212
In proposing this approach, I fully understand the difficulties involved in re-
solving the issue of expected cost recoupment.2 13 The use of so-called "Holly-
wood" accounting rules that renders even the most profitable movie a money
loser,2 14 the desire to allocate some part of the cost of unpopular works to the
money-making popular works, and other wrinkles will undoubtedly complicate
the cost recoupment issues. Despite these issues, I believe the approach is worka-
ble for three reasons. First, the adversarial process has proven its ability to cut
through Hollywood's accounting and other tricks used to minimize the appear-
ance of profits in other litigation contexts.2 15 In Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures, for
211. I understand that this means that we will give works different scope to their copy-
rights depending on what is necessary to generate an ex ante expectation of profitability. A
marginal work, right at the margins of expected profitability, will have the right to control un-
authorized copying and the preparation of unauthorized derivative works. A more popular and
profitable work that will recoup its costs with much narrower or shorter protection will not.
This does not violate principles of horizontal equity, however, any more than the fact that a
recently published work has those rights today, while a work first published before 1924 does
not. My house may be more valuable than your house. I may have different rights associated
with my land than you do. For example, if my land is rural, I may have the right to operate a
farm on it, where you, as the owner of an urban parcel, may not. None of these differences
violate principles of horizontal equity so long as the differences reflect the underlying equitable
principles and purposes copyright, or real property regimes are intended to serve.
212. The Court has recognized the possibility of denying injunctive relief in cases present-
ing a close, but ultimately unsuccessful, assertion of fair use. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 n.10;
see also Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REv. 1105, 1122 (1990) (pro-
posing that courts consider carefully before granting injunctive relief in cases presenting close
fair use issues).
213. I explored the similar cost recoupment issues in patent law nearly twenty years ago
in proposing that courts incorporate such considerations as a secondary factor for the non-
obviousness inquiry. See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L.
REv. 363 (2000).
214. See Mike Masnick, "Hollywood Accounting" Losing In The Courts, TECHDIRT (Jul. 8, 2010),
https://perma.cc/JA4W-5A6X (showing the accounting tricks that Warner Bros. used to show
a $167 million loss on Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix despite $938 million in rev-
enue).
215. See, e.g., id. (noting jury verdicts on popular television programs Who Wants to be a
Millionaire and Nash Bridges awarding millions of dollars for profit shares despite producer's
claims that programs lost money); Eriq Gardner, Fox Rocked by $179M "Bones" Ruling: Lying,
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example, Art Buchwald sued Paramount alleging it had turned his eight-page
screen treatment into the movie Coming to America.2 16 After the judge determined
that Paramount had used Buchwald's treatment, Paramount contended that the
movie had not earned any profits, despite earning $288 million in revenues,217
and that Buchwald was therefore not entitled to compensation.218 The judge re-
jected this argument, however,219 and his decision forced Paramount to pay Buch-
wald and his partner $825,000 in settlement.220
Second, even if these accounting tricks fool some of the people some of the
time, and thereby make the proposed approach under-inclusive, these tricks still
have their limits. Even with all the accounting tricks in the world, it would be
hard, I think, to persuade a judge or jury that the most obviously popular works,
such as the Harry Potter series, would not recoup their persuasion cost if the Lex-
icon were allowed.221 Moreover, as with any other fact at issue in litigation, a party
could attempt to prove cost recoupment circumstantially, by showing that the
work at issue was the most popular of all time or that a sequel has been made. It
may be that the proposed approach would work only for the most obviously pop-
ular and profitable works. Even so, that would be an improvement over the cur-
rent regulatory regime. It would not only reduce excess incentives to some extent,
but if popularity and profitability correlate, it would address the problem of ex-
cess incentives where the problem is most acute.
Third, I do not believe that the approach will reduce creative output. The
worry, of course, is that by eliminating any excess profits copyright owners would
otherwise earn on the popular works, we leave them with only the losses on un-
popular works. Creative output would therefore fall, or at least, that is what cop-
yright owners will argue. Yet, that is not what happened in the recording industry
from 2000 to 2015. During that period, competitive pressure from file sharing
lopped two-thirds off revenue from record sales; sales fell from over $20 billion
in 1999 ($2013) to under $7 billion in 2013-2014.222 Yet, despite that collapse in
Cheating and 'Reprehensible' Studio Fraud, HOLLYWOOD REP. (Feb. 27, 2019),
https://perma.cc/32DX-SPLX.
216. Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. C 706083, 1990 WL 357611, at 'I (Cal.
App. Dep't. Super. Ct.Jan. 8,1990).
217. Coming to America, Box OFFICE Mojo, https://perma.cc/4YTJ-C7XB (archived Jan. 3,
2020).
218. Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp., No. 706083, 1992 WL 1462910, at 'I (Cal.
App. Dep't. Super. Ct. Mar. 16, 1992) ("All of these witnesses believe Bernheim and Buchwald
are entitled to no additional contingent compensation because 'Coming to America' has gener-
ated no net profits.").
219. Id. at '5.
220. See Robert W. Welkos, Buchwald, Paramount Settle Film Dispute, Los ANGELES TIMES
(Sept. 12, 1995), https://perma.cc/RS29-2Z32.
221. See Masnick, supra note 214 (showing the accounting tricks that Warner Bros. used to
show a $167 million loss on Harry Potter and the Order of the Phoenix despite $938 million in
revenue).
222. See Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 74-80.
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revenue, there was no fall in music output.2 2 3 To the contrary, both the quantity
and quality of music output either increased or remained constant.224
I recognize that the proposed approach creates a risk that a judge or jury may
mistakenly find that a copyright owner expected to recoup its costs if a defend-
ant's use were allowed, but I believe that that risk is not a serious concern for three
reasons. First, for copyright owners with large portfolios, judges and juries have
to get the issue right only on average. It may be that factfinders will occasionally
find an expectation of cost recoupment when they should not, but they will also
occasionally find no expectation of recoupment when they should. With large
portfolios, the risk of type 1 errors is offset by the risk of type 2 errors.
Second, the risk the proposed approach creates arises only when a copyright
owner decides to sue. Not every profitable work will face a potentially infringing
use precisely at the moment it becomes profitable. But if a work faces such a use
as it approaches profitability, adopting the proposed approach creates a risk of
invalidity, and that risk forces the copyright owner to consider carefully whether
the potential benefits from the litigation is worth the risk of a cost-recoupment
finding. If the risks of a cost recoupment finding appear unduly high, the copy-
right owner can choose to tolerate the specific defendant's use at issue, rather than
risk losing the enforceability of its copyright altogether. In addition to aligning
copyright with its constitutionally defined purpose, the approach will also there-
fore have some tendency to deter overzealous copyright enforcement.225
Third, defendants will tend to under-enforce their right to copy and reuse
works under the proposed approach. Defendants will under-enforce this right for
the same reason defendants fail to challenge weak patentS2 2 6 and fail to enforce
their right to compete fairly in trademark law, as often, or as much, as they
223. Id. at 3-4, 74, 79-80; Christian Handke, Digital Copying and the Supply of Sound Record-
ings, 24 INFO. EcoN. & POLY 15 (2012); Joel Waldfogel, Copyright Protection, Technological Change,
and the Quality of New Products: Evidence from Recorded Music Since Napster (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 17503, 2011).
224. See Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 3-4.
225. The proposed approach would thus ensure a finding of fair use in cases involving ex-
tremely popular works, such as the Harry Potter lexicon and The Cat Not in the Hat. Compare Dr.
Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d. 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding The Cat
Not in the Hat was not a fair use and hence infringing); Penguin Random House LLC v. Colting,
270 F. Supp. 3d 736 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (finding that the Harry Potter lexicon was not a fair use
and was infringing).
226. See FED. TRADE COMMISSION, PAY-FOR-DELAY: How DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST
CONSUMERS BILLIONS: A FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION STAFF STUDY (2010) (noting that the ben-
efits of successful challenges to drug patents flow mostly to consumers in the form of lower
prices); Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litiga-
tion Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943, 943 (2004); Glynn S. LunneyJr., FTC v. ACTAVIS: The Patent-Antitrust
Intersection Revisited, 93 N.C. L. REv. 375, 375, 387-88 (2015); John R. Thomas, Collusion and
Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 305,
333-34 (2001); see also Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intellectual Property Defenses, 113
COLUM. L. REv. 1483,1483 (2013) (recognizing that this problem may apply to intellectual prop-
erty cases more generally).
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should.227 In all three instances, most of the benefits from winning such litigation
flow to consumers in the form of lower prices and increased competition, rather
than to the successful defendant.228
Thus, incorporating a work-by-work expectation of cost recoupment stand-
ard into copyright would better align copyright with its constitutional objective.
Such an approach would avoid the uniformity costs copyright otherwise imposes
and would attempt to tailor protection on a work-by-work basis. Such tailoring
would tend to ensure that, for every potential work for which the marginal social
value exceeds its cost, a copyright owner has a reasonable opportunity to recoup
its persuasion costs. Yet, it would do so without generating undue and socially
costly excess incentives. At the very least, such an approach would reduce, per-
haps sharply, the excess incentives copyright currently provides.
As an alternative to such work-by-work tailoring, Congress and the courts
could adopt a short and narrow copyright that is relatively ineffective at prevent-
ing unauthorized copying generally. Copyright has expanded significantly in both
length and breadth since Congress enacted the first copyright act in 1790.229 The
incentives-access balance has proven ineffective as a tool for slowing this expan-
sion. While public choice considerations partially explain this ineffectiveness,23 0
part of the reason the incentives-access balance has failed is that it intrinsically
suggests that all incentives are welfare-enhancing and that more incentives are
generally better.231 But, as I have shown, this is wrong. Only incentives for works
at the margins of profitability are welfare enhancing. Additional incentives for
non-marginal works impose welfare losses. More incentives are therefore not al-
ways better. Evaluating copyright's expansion using the marginal versus excess
incentives balance plainly reveals the inefficiency and unfairness of that expan-
sion.
If we evaluate copyright's expansion in length and breadth since 1790 in
terms of marginal and excess incentives, much of that expansion seems dispro-
portionately likely to generate excess, rather than marginal, incentives. The
longer term, for example, increases the earnings only for works with enduring
227. See Glynn S. LunneyJr., Trademark's Judicial De-Evolution: Why Courts Get Trademark
Cases Wrong Repeatedly, 106 CALIF. L. REv. 1195, 1201 (2018).
228. See, e.g., In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig, 686 F.3d 197, 208 (3rd Cir. 2012) ("The FTC esti-
mates that about one year after market entry an average generic pharmaceutical product takes
over ninety percent of the patent holder's unit sales and sells for fifteen percent of the price of
the name brand product. This price differential means that consumers, rather than generic pro-
ducers, are typically the biggest beneficiaries of generic entry." (citation omitted)).
229. Lunney, The Death of Copyright, supra note 35, at 2-3 (tracing the expansion in term
and scope).
230. Id. at 40-44.
231. As I have explained elsewhere, access and incentives may also appear as two-sides of
the same coin. See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Empirical Copyright: A Case Study of File Sharing, Sales
Revenue, and Music Output, 24 SUP. CT. ECON. REv. 261, 558-59 (2016). This may make the reso-
lution of the balancing unclear in ways that reframing the issue as marginal versus excess in-
centives does not.
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popularity. But if popularity coincides with profitability, these are precisely the
works that have likely already recouped their costs and that therefore least need
additional protection. Adding twenty years to the copyright term in 1998 un-
doubtedly benefitted Disney as the owner of the copyrights in Winnie the Pooh and
Steamboat Willie, but the associated windfall represented socially costly excess, not
socially beneficial marginal, incentives.23 2 For the average work published in
1923, the longer term did essentially nothing in terms of additional revenue.2 3 3
While we would need additional data to know for sure, it seems quite likely that
a longer term disproportionately generates excess, not marginal, incentives.
Similarly, data may also show that broad and non-statutory judicial interpre-
tations of the reproduction and derivative work right disproportionately benefit
non-marginal works. Read literally, "copy," "print," or "reproduce" would seem to
suggest that copyright prohibits only exact copying of an entire work.2 34 Courts
however refused to give the statutory language such a literal construction, and
over the last two-hundred years, have steadily expanded the infringement stand-
ard.2 3 5 In Daly v. Palmer,2 3 6 for example, a court first recognized that copying a
single dramatic scene, the railroad rescue,23 7 was sufficient to establish infringe-
ment. Later decisions further expanded the scope of infringement. In Kalem Co. v.
Harper Bros.,2 38 the Court affirmed a finding that a motion picture infringed the
novel, Ben Hur, under a broad reading of the dramatization right.2 3 9 In Micro Star
v. Formgen, Inc.,2 40 the Ninth Circuit held that the distribution of additional,
232. That Disney was willing to spend resources to lobby Congress tends to establish that
these were excess, rather than marginal incentives. These xpenditures represent precisely the
sort of socially wasteful rent-seeking that convert what would otherwise be surplus into cost.
See Gordon Tullock, The Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. EcoN.J. 224, 228,
231 (1967) (noting that companies will spend resources lobbying to establish protective tariffs
and monopolizing to capture monopoly rents).
233. Cf Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8,
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (No. 01-618) ("[T]he current copyright term already has
nearly the same present value as an infinite copyright term.").
234. Copyright Act of 1790 § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124 (giving the copyright owner the exclusive
right to "print, re-print, publish or vend" the copyrighted work); see Lunney, The Death of Cop-
yright, supra note 35, at 2.
235. In 1994, the Court credited Judge Story's decision in Folsom v. Marsh with laying the
foundation for the modern fair use doctrine. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 569, 576. Of course, at
the time, Judge Story was not narrowing copyright's scope by recognizing a fair use defense,
but broadening its scope, by finding that an abridgement infringed the reproduction right. See
Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1841) (acknowledging that a fair abridgement
was not infringing but finding the abridgement at issue to be infringing nonetheless).
236. 6 F. Cas. 1132 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1869).
237. In the railroad scene, the villain tied a victim to railroad tracks, from which, at the last
second as a train approached, the hero rescued the victim. Id. at 1133-34.
238. 222 U.S. 55 (1911).
239. Id. at 61.
240. 154 F.3d 1107(9th Cir. 1998).
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player-designed game levels for the videogame Duke Nukem constituted infringe-
ment under a broad reading of the derivative work right. In Williams v. Gaye,241
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the jury's finding that the song Blurred Lines infringed
the Marvin Gaye hit, Got to Give It Up, 24 2 under a broad reading of the reproduc-
tion right.243
Having established the excess-marginal incentive trade-off as the test for
welfare-enhancing copyright, the key normative question becomes whether ex-
panding the infringement standard beyond "exact copies of the entire work by
commercial competitors for profit" benefits marginal works more than, or at least
as much as, non-marginal works. It seems unlikely. Each of the underlying works
at issue in these four cases were themselves quite popular in their day. More gen-
erally, when we focus on the typical work from which a movie or translation is
made or to which homage is paid, I would expect we would find that that typical
work is usually exceedingly popular. Best-selling novels often get movie deals.
Unpopular novels rarely do. If that is generally true, then an expansive view of
copyright benefits more popular works far more than it benefits less popular
works. Like an extended term, expansive rights seem quite likely to generate in-
centives that are disproportionately excess, rather than marginal.
While I am satisfied that longer terms and broader scope disproportionately
generate welfare-diminishing excess incentives, rather than welfare-enhancing
marginal incentives, I recognize that others may desire more data and analysis on
these issues. In the meantime, as that work is done, I would simply caution courts
to avoid overly expansive interpretations of copyright protection. As the Ninth
Circuit has cautioned in another context, "[d]isapproval of the copyist's oppor-
tunism may be an understandable first reaction, 'but this initial response to the
problem [needs to be] curbed in deference to the greater public good.' 2 4 4 In order
to avoid undue excess incentives, the more popular a work is, the less copyright
protection it should receive. To a large extent, the very fact that a work has been
copied is itself probably the best evidence we have that the work is not a marginal
work and so does not merit the copyright protection sought.
D. Responses to Likely Objections
The likely objections to the proposed approach are meritless and boil down
to little more than it is not what we currently do.245 Some might insist that in a
241. 885 F.3d 1150,1106(9th Cir. 2018).
242. Got To Give It Up peaked at number one on the Billboard Hot 100 chart on June 25,
1977. See Marvin Gaye, BILLBOARD, https://perma.cc/48ZK-SA2V (archivedJan. 3, 2020).
243. Williams, 885 F.3d at 1138.
244. Smith v. Chanel, Inc, 402 F.2d 562, 568 (9th Cir. 1968) (quoting American Safety Ta-
ble Co. v. Schreiber, 269 F.2d 255, 272 (2d Cir. 1959)).
245. As Oliver Wendell Holmes once explained: "It is revolting to have no better reason
for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry VI. It is still more revolting
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free market economy, a copyright owner should be able to capture everything
that, with the assistance of copyright, they can force consumers to pay. As a factual
description of how copyright owners are likely to behave, that statement is per-
fectly adequate. It tells us how copyright owners are likely to behave against the
backdrop of whatever regulatory regime we establish. As a normative principle
for designing a sensible copyright regime, it is completely inadequate. It tells us
nothing about the nature of the regulatory regime we should establish.
Alternatively, some might insist that it is neither fair nor efficient that
Sheeran should earn the same for Shape of You as someone earns for a marginal
song to which hardly anyone listens. But it is entirely fair and efficient. In a com-
petitive market economy, the costs of a good, not its value, dictate its price.246
Consider a heart surgeon who saves your life or a nurse practitioner who gives
you a vaccine. Neither earns the value of their work, in the sense of the maximum
reservation price a patient could be forced to pay to avoid dying. Rather, both
earn a largely cost-base return for the service they provided. It is undoubtedly
true that these markets are not perfectly competitive. Government regulations,
other barriers to entry, and other market imperfections undoubtedly are present.
Yet, to the extent that these markets are competitive, the price difference between
the surgery and the vaccine should primarily reflect an underlying difference in
cost. That is how competitive markets work. If copyright intends to create a mar-
ket that mimics a competitive market, it should strive to do the same. As a result,
if Shape of You cost the same as a marginal song to author and distribute, then that
cost is all the market return that fairness and efficiency require each to earn.247
Moreover, the plea that we should not treat copyright owners this way be-
cause we do not treat doctors, lawyers, and other high-earning professionals this
way relies on a false analogy.2 48 That we have copyright already establishes that
we have decided to treat copyright owners differently from these other profes-
sionals. Having made that decision, it is a bit perverse to insist that we must turn
if the grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply per-
sists from blind imitation of the past." Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L.
REv. 457,468 (1897).
246. See 1992 Merger Guidelines, 57 Fed. Reg. 41,552 §§ 1.0-1.22 (Sept. 10, 1992); PHILLIP
AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUSTANALYSIS: PROBLEMS, TEXT, CASES 556 (5th ed. 1997);JEAN
TIROLE, THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 284 (1988); DON E. WALDMAN & ELIZABETH J.
JENSEN, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: THEORY AND PRACTICE 40,437,667 (2nd ed. 2001); William
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Market Power in Antitrust Cases, 94 HARV. L. REv. 937, 941 (1981).
247. Of course, the proposed approach would probably not limit Sheeran strictly to a cost-
based reward. Other market forces, including the sale of a rivalrous service, such as concert
tickets, would likely ensure that Sheeran captured much more than the marginal or average
artist for his song.
248. For an example of the false analogy in action, see Hughes & Merges, supra note 64, at
542 ("We recognize that there may well be some 'superstars' of the entertainment business who
are earning far more than is needed to induce their maximum productivity, just as there are
many bankers, CEOs, physicians, and lawyers who are earning more than is needed to induce
their maximum productivity.").
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around and somehow treat them the same.249 In any event, for these superstar
works, it is copyright itself, and in particular the overly broad, overly long copy-
right that we have today, that is preventing the competitive market from working.
Treating copyright owners and other professionals the same would require a cop-
yright regime that ensures that competitive market forces bear on superstar art-
ists in the same way that they bear on successful professionals in other fields. This
would require an approach that mimics the cost-based returns that prevail in
these other markets.
A more serious concern is that the proposed approach may unintentionally
shift consumption more sharply in favor of the most popular works. By eliminat-
ing or reducing protection for the most popular works, the proposed approach
would reduce the price for access to, and reuse of, such works. It might thereby
make the L curve even more pronounced. Such a concern misunderstands my
point, however. If consumers want less expensive copies of, or more derivative
works based upon, extremely popular works, and the proposed approach satisfies
that desire, that is not bias or inefficiency. That is the market working as it should.
Honda Accords are much less expensive than Ferrari Testarossas. Because of that
price difference, more consumers drive Accords than drive Testarossas. Yet, that
price-driven shift in consumption is not a flaw, but a feature of a competitive
market economy. So long as the price difference reflects a real difference in cost
the resulting shift in consumption is not bias, but efficiency.
The same competitive market principles should govern copyrighted works.
If one work is far more popular than another such that its cost, even if higher in
total, is much lower when spread out over the larger number of units sold, a lower
price is fully appropriate. If that lower price shifts demand in favor of the more
popular and, by unit sold, less-expensive work, that is not bias, but efficiency.
249. There are two key differences. First, we use markets and price for two purposes with
respect to rivalrous goods and services, such as a surgeon's time. LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT'S EXCESS,
supra note 5, at 35, 198 n.6. The price serves both: (i) to incentivize the surgeon to develop the
requisites skills; and (ii) to allocate the surgeon's intrinsically scarce time between patients. But
copyright protection, and price in the resulting markets, only serves the first purpose. Once a
recording of a work is made, copies of the work are no longer intrinsically scarce. It is non-
rivalrous. I can have a copy and so can you. It is copyright and only copyright that allows the
copyright owner to create an artificial scarcity, and it does so in order to incentivize the author
or artist to create the recording. There is no need for a price to allocate an intrinsically scarce
resource between potential uses, because the resource at issue-copies of a work-are not in-
trinsically scarce. Second, in addition to the non-rival character of works of authorship, works
of authorship are also subject to technological multiplication. If all the consumers in the world
want to listen exclusively to Adele, they can do so. Adele may tire, but her recordings do not. In
contrast, with current technology, a surgeon can work on only one patient at a time and must,
on occasion, rest. See id. at 34-35,198 n.6.
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V. STORIES, BELIEFS, AND FACTS: ARE WE RATIONAL?
Many of us love the idea of copyright. Unfortunately, the reality does not
match the ideal. As hard data becomes available, we are finding that the romanti-
cized truths we hold dear, and as if self-evident, regarding copyright are not true
at all. In copyright, we need to stop relying on the stories and start relying on the
data.
In this article, I present data from the PC videogame industry. That data
demonstrates that the distribution of demand in that industry is L-shaped. The
top 1% of the games, by popularity, capture nearly half the players. The top 10%
of the games capture nearly 90% of the players. Broad, long, and effective copy-
right protection, of the sort we have today, lavishes vast rewards on these popular
games in copyright's tall peak. However, today's copyright does very little, and so
long as copyright remains uniform, can do very little, for the vast majority of
works lying at the margins of profitability in copyright's short tail.
If we want a copyright that actually serves to promote "the Progress of Sci-
ence," we have two choices. First, we can introduce non-uniformity into copy-
right. There are many ways we might accomplish this. But each would seek to
tailor copyright protection on a work-by-work basis to ensure that each work
receives precisely the protection it needs-and no more-to cover its associated
persuasion costs. In this article, I propose that we achieve such tailoring by incor-
porating a work-by-work cost recoupment limitation into copyright's existing
structure of otherwise uniformly broad and long protection. Whether by Con-
gressional amendment or by judicial interpretation of the fourth fair use factor,
copyright should provide the minimum protection needed to generate an ex ante
expectation of cost recoupment on a work-by-work basis. Beyond that minimum,
no further protection should be provided. At the very least, beyond that mini-
mum, courts should find that granting injunctive relief for infringement would
disserve the public interest and so deny injunctive relief. Second and alternatively,
if we fail to embrace the tailoring approach, then we must make copyright short,
narrow, and relatively ineffective at preventing unauthorized reuse and copying
generally. Otherwise, the costs associated with such uniform protection will, in
the face of an L curve, overwhelm any benefits copyright might otherwise pro-
vide. Only through one of these two approaches can we avoid the inefficiency and
unfairness that copyright's present uniformity imposes in the face of an L curve
distribution of demand.
No one ever argues for copyright on the grounds that superstar authors and
artists need more money. Yet, if the L-shaped distribution of demand for PC vid-
eogames is representative for works of authorship generally, overpaying super-
stars may be all, or mostly all, that copyright in its present form does. While cop-
yright undoubtedly provides some incentives for average artists, and their works
undeniably generate some social value, 90% of copyright's incentives flow to the
top 10% of works. Given that distribution, the losses copyright generates by over-
paying superstars, already firmly ensconced in the wealthy 1%, far outweigh
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whatever benefits in efficiency or fairness that copyright generates by offering,
relatively speaking, token incentives to the average or marginal artist or author.
Fortunately, copyright need not remain a tool of the 1%. By incorporating
cost-recoupment into the fourth fair use factor, courts can better tailor copyright
to ensure sufficient incentives for all socially valuable works of authorship with-
out creating undue or excess incentives for the most popular works. Such an ap-
proach will tend to expand fair use with respect to the most popular and profita-
ble works and will thereby make copyright more efficient, more fair, and more
just.
